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Act LVIII of 2001 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, which entered into effect on 13 July 2001, defines the primary objective of
Hungary’s central bank as the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Low inflation allows the economy to function
more effectively, contributes to better economic growth over time and helps to moderate cyclical fluctuations in output and
employment.
In the inflation targeting system, since August 2005 the Bank has sought to attain price stability by ensuring an inflation rate
near the 3% medium-term objective. The Monetary Council, the supreme decision-making body of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank,
performs a comprehensive review of the expected development of inflation every three months, in order to establish the
monetary conditions consistent with achieving the inflation target. The Council’s decision is the result of careful consideration
of a wide range of factors, including an assessment of prospective economic developments, the inflation outlook, money and
capital market trends and risks to stability.
In order to promote public awareness and understanding of its monetary policy function, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank regularly
publishes information available at the time it makes its policy decisions. The aim of the Quarterly Report on Inflation is to
present forecasts of inflation and detailed assessments of the key macroeconomic factors driving inflation prepared by the staffs
of the Bank’s Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and Financial Analysis Departments. The projections are conditional:
they assume unchanged monetary and fiscal policies and do not necessarily contain the most probable outcomes for economic
variables which are beyond the control of the central bank; rather, they are based on the forecasting rules developed earlier.
The analyses in this Report were prepared by staff in the MNB’s Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and Financial
Analysis Departments under the general direction of Ágnes Csermely, Director. The project was managed by Mihály András
Kovács, Deputy Head of Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis, with the help of Mihály Hoffmann, Gergely Kiss and
Barnabás Virág. The Report was approved for publication by Ferenc Karvalits, Deputy Governor.
Primary contributors to this Report include: Péter Bauer, Mihály Hoffmann, Áron Horváth, Gergely Kiss, Norbert M. Kiss,
András Komáromi, András Mihály Kovács, Zsolt Lovas, Ádám Martonosi, Zsusza Munkácsi, Róbert Szemere, Gábor Szigel,
Béla Szörfi, Tímea Várnai and Barnabás Virág. Other contributors to the analyses and forecasts in this Report include various
staff members of the Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and the Financial Analysis Departments.
The Report incorporates valuable input from the Monetary Council’s comments and suggestions following its meetings on 
9 February and 23 February 2009. The projections and policy considerations, however, reflect the views of staff in the
Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and the Financial Analysis Departments and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Monetary Council or the MNB.
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The February projection was produced against the backdrop of uncertain
macroeconomic and financial market conditions, similarly to the circumstances
prevailing at the time of the previous Report. Although strains in financial
markets have eased somewhat in the past quarter owing to actions by central
banks and governments, market conditions remain substantially worse than they
were before the onset of the crisis. The repricing of risks forced banks to pursue
much more cautious lending policies, as a result of which lending to the
household and corporate sectors slowed in the majority of countries worldwide.
Governments of the world’s major economies announced substantial fiscal
actions intended to mitigate the impact of the crisis on the real economy. But
these policy packages have so far been unable to trigger a sharp revision of the
outlook for future economic activity. Available macroeconomic data indicate a
dramatic fall in world industrial activity: industrial production and new orders
in Europe, for example, show double-digit declines, and global confidence
indices are at their lowest levels in decades.
At the time the global recession set in, the Hungarian economy was already in a
very weak position. Apart from the outstanding performance of agriculture, the
output of industries within the private sector fell in the third quarter of 2008.
The further deterioration in external and domestic macroeconomic conditions
in the last quarter led to a sharp, 2% year-on-year decline in GDP.
Domestic firms adjusted to the rapid fall in output by restraining the growth of
wages and reducing the number of employees; however, these proved
insufficient to offset the decline in sales. As weak demand did not allow
businesses to raise their prices, the recent rise in unit labour costs has led to a
further deterioration in corporate sector profitability. 
Rapid disinflation continued at the end of last year. The sharp drop in
international commodity prices was the main contributing factor to the fall in
inflation; however, declining domestic demand also had a perceptible effect on
prices: despite the substantially weaker exchange rate, tradables inflation
declined and the rate of increase of services prices fell further.
Bank lending to both households and firms came to a sudden halt in 2008 Q4,
with demand-side as well as supply-side developments being contributing
factors. On the demand side, the economic downturn and increasing uncertainty
surrounding income expectations acted as a significant drag on economic agents’
willingness to borrow. On the supply side, banks’ falling appetite to take risk led
to a tightening of credit standards and an increase in loan prices. 
The February projection is based on the assumption that there is unlikely to be
a sharp improvement in external demand conditions and bank lending activity
over the next few quarters, with some recovery expected from 2010, in line with
the forecasts of international institutions. Nevertheless, the possibility of a
prolonged deterioration in business conditions and lending activity in Europe
cannot be ruled out, which is reflected as a shift in risks to GDP growth to the
downside relative to the central case. A stronger increase in household savings
Uncertain financial market environment,
declining lending activity, coupled with
recession in developed countries 
Parallel with Europe, Hungary fell into
recession again, the quick disinflation
continued
The domestic banking sector has been
moving in parallel with international
financial tendencies
Global economic activity and bank
lending are unlikely to turn around
rapidly
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than assumed in the central case in response to increased income uncertainty
represents another downside risk to economic performance in the short term,
which, however, may improve the country’s external financing position.
The sharper-than-expected economic downturn put pressure on the government
to take fiscal adjustment measures. These are aimed, in part, at facilitating short-
term economic adjustment and in part at ensuring more sustainable general
government finances. In the current projection, the policy package announced
by the government on 16 February, and consisting of reductions in taxes on
labour, indirect tax increases and expenditure cuts, is implemented.
As the government’s policy package is aimed at reducing net taxes on
production activities, to the detriment of non-production activities, their overall
impact on the growth potential of the Hungarian economy will be positive in
the longer run in terms of real convergence. By reducing the tax burden on the
corporate sector, the government measures are expected to increase the demand
for labour and stimulate capital spending. However, higher indirect taxes and
expenditure cuts are likely to reduce household disposable income and
consumption expenditure temporarily, contributing to a decline in GDP in the
first two years. But from 2011 supply-side factors will be beginning to dominate. 
Based on available information, the measures announced by the government
seem sufficient to reduce the deficit-to-GDP ratio below 3% on an ESA basis;
however, the measures will only allow a reduction in deficit to around 3.3% in
2010. Further specific actions may be required to keep the deficit below the 3%
level.
In the current projection, Hungarian economic growth is negative in the next
two years, as a combined result of the downturn in international business
activity, the decline in lending and the government’s adjustment measures. 
The weakening in external economic activity in the short term is expected to
make a negative contribution to production in the export sector this year.
However, a slow recovery is expected in 2010. As a result of deteriorating
economic conditions, firms and households are likely to cut back on spending.
Businesses will adjust to the decline in sales by reducing employment and
restraining the growth of wages; however, their profitability is likely to continue
falling until 2010. Households’ increasing uncertainty about their future
incomes is expected to result in a rise in the sector’s propensity to save, due to
falling employment.
The procyclical behaviour of the financial sector has been a negative
contributing factor to the weakening in economic activity. Banks’ falling
appetite to take risk has accelerated the decline in loan demand due to
deteriorating profitability. In addition to the negative effect on capital spending,
the tightening of working capital loans may cause difficulties in maintaining
production in some sub-sectors. 
Import growth will decline dramatically due to the sharp fall in domestic
absorption, as a result of which the contribution of net trade to GDP growth
may be positive over the entire forecast period, despite the decline in exports.
Our projection assumes the
implementation of government
measures, announced on the 16th of
February
ESA deficit below 3% can be achieved for
this year, further detailed measures may
be required for 2010
The economic downturn may last until
2010
Provided that the basic assumptions (an exchange rate of EUR/HUF 290 and oil
prices around USD 50 per barrel, implementation of the announced government
measures) hold true, inflation may rise above 3% in the second half of the year.
However, the main factor behind this is the effect of increases in VAT and other
indirect taxes – inflation, adjusted for the effects of tax increases, may remain
below the target over the entire forecast period. First, deteriorating global
business conditions may further reduce imported inflationary pressure in the
short term. Second, declining domestic activity also may lead to a very low
inflation environment in the medium term. 
Overall, the risks to inflation lie slightly to the upside relative to the central case.
A sharper economic downturn poses downside risks to inflation, and higher risk
premia on forint assets than envisaged in the central case pose upside risks to
inflation, assuming unchanged interest rate conditions.
In the projection, Hungary’s external balance improves significantly, due mainly
to households’ rising saving rate. In addition, however, the reduction in the tax
burden on the corporate sector and tighter credit standards may also lead to an
improvement in firms’ financing position.
SUMMARY
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Inflation picks up slightly over the short
term, then slows to around 3%
Significant reduction in the external
financing requirement 
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(The forecasts are conditional: the baseline scenario represents the most probable scenario, which applies only if the
assumptions presented in Chapter 3 materialise; unless otherwise indicated, it represents percentage changes on the previus
year.)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Actual Projection
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation1,** 2.4 6.0 5.1 4.2 2.5 
Consumer price index** 3.9 8.0 6.1 3.7 2.8 
Economic growth
External demand (GDP based) 3.9 3.8 2.3 -1.2 0.8 
Fiscal impact on demand2,*** 0.4 -3.7 -1.8 0.0 -0.3 
Household consumption expenditure 1.9 0.7 0.3 -5.1 -1.6 
Gross fixed capital formation -6.1 1.5 -1.4 -7.1 -0.5 
Domestic absorption 1.8 -0.9 0.5 -4.5 -1.2 
Export 18.6 15.9 4.8 -6.0 4.8 
Import3 14.8 13.1 4.7 -7.1 4.2 
GDP 4.1 1.1 0.6 -3.5 -0.5 
Current account deficit3
As a percentage of GDP 7.5 6.4 7.9 3.9 4.5 
In EUR billions 6.8 6.5 8.3 3.6 4.2 
External financing requirement3
As a percentage of GDP 6.9 5.3 6.8 2.1 1.7 
Labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings4,8 8.2 8.0 8.3 0.8 6.5
Whole-economy employment5,** 0.7 -0.1 -1.2 -2.0 -1.8
Private sector gross average earnings6,8 9.4 (7.9) 9.1 (8.5) 9.2 (8.3) 4.0 6.5
Private sector employment5,** 1.2 0.9 -1.0 -2.4 -2.3
Unit labour costs in the private sector5,7 4.4 4.0 6.5 6.4 2.0 
Household real income* 1.3 -2.2 -1.2 -1.8 -1.2 
1
For technical reasons, this indicator may temporarily differ from the index published by the CSO; over the long term, however, it follows a similar
trend. 
2
Calculated from the so-called augmented (SNA) balance; a negative value means a narrowing of aggregate demand. 
3
Due to the high level of Net Errors and Omissions (NEO) the current account deficit/external financing requirement for the 2004-2007 period may be
higher than suggested by official figures.
4
Calculated on a cash-flow basis. 
5
According to the CSO LFS data. 
6
According to the original CSO data. The numbers in brackets refer to wages excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses.
7
Private sector unit labour cost calculated with a wage index excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses. 
8
In 2010, the abolition of tax-free benefits raises gross wages by 4.4%, if the government plans as known at the closing of this Report will materialize.
* MNB estimate. 
** The 2008 figures of these time series are not forecasts, but actual data. 
*** Fiscal impact on demand does not contain the result of MNB for 2009 and 2010.
Summary table of the baseline scenario
1  The evaluation of recent 
macroeconomic data

While the deterioration in international economic conditions
became obvious as early as the third quarter of 2008, the
process continued in the fourth quarter at a faster rate than
anticipated. The previous Report identified two main risk
factors, which may determine developments both in global
economic performance and in Hungarian economic activity
over the next few quarters. One of these is a global
deceleration of credit growth, which may lead to a downturn
in both the production and the consumption sides of the
economy. The second risk factor is a decline in foreign trade
activity. Since Hungary is deeply integrated into the global
economy, both in terms of financial and trade relations,
negative global effects have recently had an almost instant
impact on the domestic growth path.
By the final months of the year, the downturn in lending had
become a general phenomenon in the developed world,
which primarily reflected banks’ increased risk aversion.
Combined with deteriorating income prospects, this initially
affected the turnover of consumer durables, as these goods
are typically financed by loans and are characterised by great
income flexibility. As a result, unfavourable developments
coming from financial markets triggered a decline in
industrial output at first; however, by the end of 2008 they
had a significant impact on European economic activity in
general. The confidence indicators of the corporate and the
household sectors fell to a historical low. Against the
backdrop of a steep and rapid downturn in European
industrial output, the growth prospects of the sector
deteriorated even further than observed during the period of
economic slowdown in 2001–2002. 
Confidence indices (EABCI, IFO), which move closely
together with international economic activity, suggest a
rapidly deteriorating economic environment. In the last
months of the year the indices plunged to a historical low on
several consecutive occasions, which is consistent with the
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • FEBRUARY 2009 13
1.1  Recession deepens across Europe
Chart 1-1
GDP growth of our main export partners
Source: Eurostat.
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Chart 1-2
Industry production of the Eurozone, Germany and
the region 
(seasonally adjusted quarterly data, annual change)
Source: Eurostat.
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Chart 1-3
Changes in the IFO1 and EABCI* confidence indices
* Business Climate Indicator for Euro-Area countries published by the
European Commission.
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1 The IFO index is valued between ±100. Approximately 7,000 firms in manufacturing, construction, wholesaling and retailing are included in this survey every month.
They have to value their current position and their future expectations in 6 months time with a three-grade scale.
developments observed in the economic activity of the euro
area. In contrast with the significant decline observed in
previous months, the last data point in January indicated a
slight adjustment in certain cases (IFO); however, given the
historically low level at which the adjustment occurred, for
the time being we cannot conclude that a positive turn is in
sight. 
The latest forecasts of international institutions
2
foreshadow
a more significant decline for this year and next year than
their previous forecasts indicated. Previous growth paths
expecting a V-shaped, rapid upswing are increasingly
replaced by scenarios assuming a U-shaped, more prolonged
downturn. 
Driven by expectations of a global economic slowdown and
further, sustained recession, commodity prices fell even
further. In previous quarters crude oil, commodities and food
prices fell sharply and stabilised at low levels, which led to a
worldwide decline in inflation.
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Chart 1-4
Changes in global commodity prices*
* Denominated in USD. The highlighted product groups (food, crude oil
and metal) comprise around 80% of the commodity index total. 
Source: IMF and IFS database.
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2 European Commission, IMF.
The global slowdown reached Hungary when its economic
growth was slow. Reflecting a remarkable upsurge in
agricultural output, until the third quarter of 2008 the
economy was able to achieve positive growth in relation to
annual dynamics; however, all other sectors gradually lost
momentum as the year progressed. In Q3 whole-economy
output – excluding agriculture – showed a decline of around
2%. In the last quarter of 2008, the deterioration in the
general macroeconomic environment caused a significant
deceleration in industrial growth and gross domestic product
showed a 2% decline in year-on-year terms. 
Construction output increased slightly in the fourth quarter,
primarily reflecting the low base and ongoing government-
related highway and utility construction projects. Consistent
with the expected fall in home construction and gradually
declining corporate building investment, the contract
portfolio of the sector continues to decline. A continuing
decline was observed in the market services sector as well.
Shrinking money markets and falling domestic demand made
an impact on all sub-sectors of industry. 
The general economic recession therefore affects all sectors,
and expectations regarding the upcoming period appear
extremely bleak. Changes in the confidence indices reconfirm
that sentiment regarding the prospects of all sectors is
strikingly unfavourable and in fact has hit a historical low.
Regarding the items of GDP absorption, by the end of the
year there was mounting evidence of a downturn in this area
as well. While the wage income of households showed a
slight increase in the second half of the year, the combination
of a deteriorating labour market environment and a steep
decline in borrowing opportunities may have restrained
investment and consumption expenditure toward the end of
the year. This assumption is supported by plummeting retail
sales at the end of the year, in particular among consumer
durable goods.
3
Gross fixed capital formation followed a declining trend
throughout the year. While corporate investment showed
signs of a slight recovery in the first half of the year, data
relating to the second half suggest that firms also started to
restrain their investment expenditure significantly. This may
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • FEBRUARY 2009 15
Chart 1-5
Contribution of major national economic sectors to
total output* 
* Preliminary data from CSO for the fourth quarter of 2008.
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Chart 1-6
Changes in the sector confidence indices in Hungary
Source: European Commission.
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3 Among the components of retail sales, the most striking decline was observed in the volume of vehicle and vehicle spare parts sales, which fell by over 21% year-on-
year in November. Even a weaker performance is supported by anecdotal information about January car sales data, which indicates a more then 50% decline in
turnover.
1.2  Rapid appearance of recession effects in the
domestic growth path
be explained primarily by two factors. On the one hand, the
poor economic situation deteriorated profitability prospects,
the volume of orders fell (and commercial inventories
increased), which prompted firms to either postpone or
cancel their scheduled investment projects on account of
their unused capacities and insufficient export markets.
Moreover, because corporate financing conditions have
considerably tightened, in many cases firms are unable to
obtain funding for their investment. Although the largest
production companies in the Hungarian corporate sector are
generally owned by non-resident firms, even parent
companies are unable to provide real assistance in terms of
funding, as they themselves are struggling with financial
problems. 
Government investment fell significantly throughout the year
in all sub-systems of general government. Owing to a number
of larger infrastructure investment projects, this situation
may in fact improve somewhat by the end of the year. The
volume of investment eligible for European Union funding
fell behind the planned figure, representing another factor
that failed to improve the state of whole-economy investment
in any significant way.
The deterioration in the trade balance – which was observed
since the middle of last year and was presumed temporary –
came to a halt in Q4 and showed signs of a slight
improvement at the end of the year. The volume of exports
and imports of goods fell; the former being attributed to the
deterioration in global economic activity, while declining
imports can be explained by a combination of restrained
exports and dwindling internal demand.
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Chart 1-7
Changes in consumption side items
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Despite a rapidly deteriorating macroeconomic environment,
2008 Q3 was characterised by a lagged adjustment of wages
and contradictory employment data. According to the labour
force survey for the third quarter, the number of employees in
the total economy increased by around 25,000, primarily in
the private sector. Nevertheless, the last few months of the year
saw larger wage reductions and staff number adjustments.
Against the backdrop of slowing economic activity and
deteriorating prospects, the production sectors (manufacturing
and the related suppliers) primarily laid off the largest number
of employees. Data for Q4 (October to December) indicate
that employment decreased by 34,000 compared with the
third quarter, and the level of inactivity continued to increase;
in other words, the decline in employment was followed by a
smaller increase in unemployment.
Because the rapid decline in production was only partly
followed by labour market developments in respect of wages
and staff numbers, unit labour costs increased. However,
poor demand did not allow companies to incorporate their
rising costs in prices, which further deteriorated corporate
profitability. Consequently, further cuts in employment and
decelerating wage dynamics are expected in the coming
quarters.
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Chart 1-8
Employment and unemployment in the national
economy
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Chart 1-9
Changes in unit labour costs in the private sector
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1.3  Gradual wage and staff number adjustments
The average annual inflation rate was 6.1% in 2008;
however, its within-year developments were highly uneven:
while price increases in the first half amounted to around 7%,
a sharp fall in prices was observed from the autumn. Changes
in the consumer price index are primarily associated with
commodity and food prices: while high commodity prices
helped maintain the price index at the beginning of the year,
from the autumn the index was moderated by falling food
and commodity prices as the narrowing of the global output
gap continued. However, the disinflationary effects of
declining domestic demand were becoming more
pronounced towards the end of the year. 
Although the decline in the prices of unprocessed foods
slowed somewhat by the end of the year, they continued to
significantly contribute to the fall in the consumer price
index through secondary effects.
4
Food and fuel prices played
an important role in the end-of-year disinflation, as falling
world oil prices reduced domestic prices significantly. In the
next period, due to the current levels of the price of oil and
the exchange rate, we cannot count on a continuously rapid
decline in inflation. This means that the disinflation period
led by rapidly declining commodity prices can shortly come
to an end, and restrained domestic demand may become an
increasingly influential factor in the disinflation process. This
tendency has strengthened in recent months. 
The inflation index of industrial products decreased in the last
few months, in spite of the weakening exchange rate. This
means that weak household demand may offset the effect of
movements in the exchange rate. With respect to services
price inflation, the sharp drop in September was not followed
by an adjustment; furthermore, January CPI data (important
because of the yearly price raising) showed a significantly
lower index than could be observed in the last few years. 
Inflation expectations of households started to decrease
notably while their perceived inflation also took a favourable
turn. Expectations have not been this low since the third
quarter of 2006, which means that the index has reached a
two-year low. A possible reason for the decrease could be a
very positive turn in the prices of foods and vehicle fuels
observed in recent months, considering that household
perceptions are the most sensitive to this product group.
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1.4  Rapid disinflation in 2008 H2
Chart 1-10
Inflation developments
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Chart 1-11
Changes in the individual components of inflation
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Chart 1-12
Inflation perceptions and expectations of
households – Median survey 
(growth rates for the past as well as the forthcoming 12 months)
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4 The January consumer price index data showed that the downward trend in food prices slowed down.
2  Financial markets and lending

In recent months, rather than continuing to focus on the
liquidity and confidence problems of financial markets,
investors turned their attention to the deteriorating state of
the real economy, which has caused a paradigm shift in global
economic thought. Central bank and government measures
focused on economic recovery and preventing the collapse of
lending processes. Risk aversion and lack of confidence
gradually started to abate from its peak observed in
September and October, investor sentiment improved
slightly, risk indices dropped, and the ongoing decline in
equity markets came to a halt. The optimism was mainly due
to the inauguration of the new US president and the radical
measures expected from him. At the same time, high
volatility and frequent directional changes in asset prices
remain; even minor pieces of negative news can turn the
temporary optimism around, and it is reasonable to say that
investor sentiment is fragile. The unfavourable welcome by
the market of the previously often delayed announcement of
the Financial Stability Plan clearly shows how erratic
financial markets are. Due to the continuing lack of ironing
out the details and vagueness regarding implementation of
the package, investor disappointment surfaced and market
sentiment fell again in February. 
Against the backdrop of declining risk indices, demand
continued to be high for short-term US government papers,
which are considered the safest. Three-month US T-bill yields
remained around 0%, but even the meagre yields could not
dampen auction demand for these instruments. At the same
time, interbank market tensions began to ease significantly, as
reflected by a substantial decline in TED spreads and Libor-
OIS spreads observed in recent months. Because access to
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2.1  Significant volatility, slightly improving
global market sentiment, active central bank
and government measures
Chart 2-1
Changes in risk indices*
* Indicators reflecting spreads on EUR-denominated debt in a breakdown
by credit rating.
Source: J.P. Morgan.
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Chart 2-2
Fed’s interest rate target vs. three-month USD
interbank and government securities market yields
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Chart 2-3
ECB base rate vs. three-month EUR interbank and
government securities market yields
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funds in the interbank market has become cheaper and easier,
central banks now play a substantially less significant part in
taking on the role of the interbank market: as a result of
declining recourse to certain facilities, the balance sheet totals
of the Fed and the ECB have shrunk. On the whole, while the
confidence crisis has eased and the state of the international
financial system has improved, the latter has not bounced
back to pre-crisis levels. 
Macroeconomic indices released during the period indicated a
profound, global weakening in economic activity; the only
remaining question is how deep and how long the recession
will be. Meanwhile, several research institutes and
supranational organisations (European Commission, IMF)
released forecasts significantly more pessimistic than their
previous forecasts, discarding previous expectations of a V-
shaped path – showing a rapid rise after hitting the bottom.
Now a prolonged, U-shaped path with persistently slow
growth is expected. With interbank market tensions
diminishing significantly and inflation risks falling, central
bank and government measures have clearly focused on the
mitigation of recession risks. In an attempt to moderate the
extent of the economic recession and a drastic credit crunch,
and to prevent the collapse of lending, large central banks
have eased monetary policy. As a result of ongoing, aggressive
interest rate cuts worldwide, central bank base rates fell to
historic lows in several developed countries (USA, United
Kingdom, Canada, Hong Kong). In the case of the Fed,
maintenance of the 0%-0.25% target band is priced in by the
market, while a further cut 50-100 on basis points in the base
rate by the ECB is expected, which might drive the base rate
to an all-time low never before observed in the euro area.
Base rates approaching zero per cent inevitably prompted
several central banks to adopt certain alternative measures,
those that are outside of the set of tools applied by traditional
monetary policy, in an attempt to scale back the economic
recession. These unorthodox monetary policy tools mainly
involved a shift towards quantitative easing and the offering
of different asset purchase facilities. The objective of these
steps was partly to reduce yields at different maturities across
the yield curve and partly to alleviate the financial problems
of the private sector. 
In the context of government measures, the series of new
economic recovery programmes and bank rescue packages
continued, the largest of which is undoubtedly the USD 787
billion massive economic stimulus package pushed through
by the Obama administration in the United States. The main
components of the fiscal stimulus plan are tax breaks,
stimulating home purchases, aid for states and for the
unemployed, and access to healthcare. According to the US
financial stability plan, the previously labelled ‘bad bank’
concept will be replaced by setting up a Private-Public
investment fund to take over the bank system’s troubled and
nonperforming assets, and more careful oversight is expected
regarding capital injections to the financial sector. Moreover,
as additional government bank rescue packages are being set
up in several other countries (Germany, France, Denmark,
United Kingdom), it has become obvious that the initial
measures taken in relation to the crisis of confidence in
September and October were insufficient. 
As a result of increased government participation, several
developed countries are expected to face significantly
increased budget deficits, which will lead to a higher volume
of sovereign bond issuance. While the increased bond supply
of developed countries may have an adverse impact on the
issuance of emerging economies through the crowding out
effect, it also raises the credit risk of developed countries.
Concerns about the deteriorating equilibrium of certain
countries, in particular the peripheral Member States of the
euro area, have already been reflected by the significantly
increasing CDS and sovereign bond spreads, and the
downgrading of their debt ratings by credit rating
institutions.
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Risk aversion and enhanced preference for assets deemed safe
continued to characterise the global investment appetite, well
illustrated by the strong yen and the dollar. This
phenomenon continues to have a devastating effect on
emerging markets; investor interest in higher-risk
instruments is rather fragile, and even though instrument
prices keep rising temporarily from time to time, this does
not imply a clear turnaround in the trend. Even though risk
indices started to decline from the end of November, risk
appetite was still far behind the period preceding the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The asset prices of emerging
markets were highly volatile and changed along with the
global investor sentiment. However, from the end of January
the assessment of the CEE region has diverged from that of
the other emerging markets and deteriorated significantly, in
both absolute and relative terms. The major factors behind
the concerns are higher than expected economic downturn,
deteriorating growth outlook due to the contracting export
markets, vulnerability caused by high external debt and a
sharp drop in net private capital inflows. 
As was the case with developed economies, recession fears
determined the economic policy measures taken in emerging
markets, and consequently the central banks of emerging
markets have attempted to support economic recovery
through a relaxed monetary policy. This process can be
observed in the Central and East European region. Two
consecutive times, the central bank of Poland decided to
lower the key policy rate by an unexpectedly high amount, by
75 basis points, reducing the rate to 4.25%. A deteriorating
economic environment combined with progressively higher
rate slashes indicate that further, intensive rate cuts lie ahead.
In the Czech Republic as well, the loosening cycle which
started in November continued; the Czech central bank
lowered the key policy rate in two steps by 100 basis points
altogether, so the Czech base rate stands at 1.75% now,
below that of the ECB. The central bank of Romania also
started monetary easing by a rate cut of 25 basis points. After
the interest rate decision of the ECB, Slovakia followed suit
and lowered its policy rate in December.
In Hungary, the central bank launched a series of interest rate
cuts with a reduction of 50 basis points, which was followed
by three additional 50 basis point cuts, bringing the extent of
monetary loosening to a total of 200 basis points. Even
though the market was caught unprepared by the initial steps,
adjustments were made relatively quickly and easily, and
expectations of market participants regarding the rate policy
were revised accordingly. According to the quotes of forward
interest rate contracts, after the decision in January market
participants anticipated 50 basis point rate cuts until the
middle of the year, and expected the key policy rate to drop
to 6.5%-7% by the end of the year. However, the significant
exchange rate depreciation has brought about a clearly
different situation. Expectations regarding further interest
rate cuts evaporated; according to asset prices and analysts’
comments the most probable outcome is an unchanged policy
rate during the following months, while the yield curve
estimated from interbank interest rates indicates an 8.5%
level of policy rate for the end of the year. 
All currencies in the region suffered a significant devaluation
in recent months, and as a result of several waves of
weakening from the end of January they reached successive
all-time lows. The steepest fall was recorded for the Polish
zloty, consequently – and due to other factors as well –
doubts started to mount regarding the schedule of the euro
changeover in Poland originally planned for 2012, especially
since premature ERM II membership might pose substantial
risks in the current, highly volatile environment. 
Similar to other currencies in the region, the forint has
weakened substantially, associated with increased volatility.
Parallel to its depreciation, long-term exchange rate
expectations also changed significantly. The shift of the
expected centre of exchange rate fluctuations into a weaker
position may be a result of the continued interest rate cuts
following the initial weakening of the exchange rate, which
indicated, as it were, that with significantly lower inflation
risks the central bank would tolerate an even weaker
exchange rate than before. At the same time, exchange rate
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2.2  Asset prices in emerging markets
Chart 2-4
Policy rate expectations
* Estimated by the MNB from interbank interest rates using the spline-
technique.
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expectations did not become asymmetrical; even with weaker
expected exchange rate value, market participants assign
notable probability to further substantial devaluations. 
In consideration of all this, movements in the forint exchange
rate was basically similar to those in the emerging currencies,
particularly to those in the regional ones. Despite several
waves of weakening in the exchange rate and a substantial
shift in exchange rate expectations, the forint foreign
exchange position of non-residents was relatively even during
the last few months; there were no significant speculative
positions taken up against the forint. On the other hand,
liquidity provision in the foreign exchange market shrank
notably; moreover, certain mechanisms that had provided
automatic support for the forint in the past were either
missing or had weakened (decreased foreign currency
lending, departure of the forward stocks of domestic
participants from exchange rate developments). As a
consequence, the probability of the risk that relatively lower
quantities may cause severe fluctuations in the exchange rate
has increased considerably. 
Changes in CDS spreads – the prices of derivatives serving as
collateral in the case of default on sovereign foreign
currency bonds of a specific country – are good indicators of
the risk perception of emerging markets and changes in
global investor sentiment. In the first half of the period since
November, spreads declined slowly and gradually up until
the beginning of January, when deteriorating investor
sentiment triggered a significant increase in the spreads
again. As was the case with the exchange rate, from
November on the CDS spread of Hungary basically followed
the changes in the global climate and, as opposed to the
previous period, country-specific factors did not affect it
significantly. During the period of improvement that lasted
until the beginning of January, the CDS spread of Hungary
narrowed to 350 basis points (7 January); however, it
subsequently jumped again, reaching 570 basis points by the
middle of February. Originating in the deteriorating
sentiment regarding the CEE region, currently the CDS
spread of Hungary exceeds that of Turkey and Brazil,
although not so long ago Hungary’s CDS spread fluctuated
at similar levels to that of those countries.
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Chart 2-5
Changes in the exchange rates of the currencies in
the region*
* Changes in percentages, 1 October 2008 = 0; a positive value indicates
a devaluation of the local currency.
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Chart 2-6
Developments in CDS spreads in some emerging
countries
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After the crisis of confidence reached its peak in October
2008 with the functional disorder of interbank markets,
turmoil in the domestic financial markets started to gradually
abate starting from November. Besides maintaining the
monetary policy instruments introduced in October, the
MNB modified its existing set of tools several times in a
continuing attempt to facilitate a gradual consolidation of the
operation of domestic markets and to assist the banking
sector in both domestic and foreign currency liquidity
management. 
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2.3  Consolidation of domestic liquidity
problems, new MNB tools
Table 2-1
Facilities and measures taken by MNB
Description of the measure Date of 
introduction
Frequency Aim of the facility Notes
FACILITIES ENHANCING FORINT LIQUIDITY
Announcement of MNB’s 
auctions for the purchase of 
government securities
17 October 2008 weekly Supporting domestic 
credit institutions’ forint 
liquidity management
Primary dealers of the Debt Management Agency, who 
fulfi l their obligations undertaken in the agreement 
concluded with the MNB
Six-month, variable-rate 
collateralised loan tenders
21 October 2008 weekly Supporting domestic 
credit institutions’ forint 
liquidity management
Till 2 February 2009: Primary dealers of the Debt 
Management Agency
From 2 February 2009: All resident credit institutions 
subject to reserve requirements
Narrowing the interest rate 
corridor around the key policy 
rate to ±50 basis points from 
±100 basis points
22 October 2008 – Supporting domestic 
credit institutions’ forint 
liquidity management
Two-week, collateralised loan 
tenders with a fi xed interest 
rate
21 October 2008 weekly Supporting domestic 
credit institutions’ forint 
liquidity management
Widening the range of eligible 
assets
in a series of steps, 
from 28 October 
2008
– Supporting domestic 
credit institutions’ forint 
liquidity management
28 October 2008: the provision on close link does not 
apply to covered bank bonds.
18 November 2008: minimum criteria for eligible assets 
have modifi ed to “”BBB-”” from “”A””.
20 February 2009: bonds issued by Hungarian local 
authorities denominated in HUF, EUR or CHF.
Reducing the reserve ratio from 
5% to 2% 
24 November 2008 – Supporting domestic 
credit institutions’ forint 
liquidity management
FACILITIES ENHANCING FOREIGN CURRENCY LIQUIDITY
Two-way O/N FX swap tenders 
(providing euro and forint 
liquidity) under a competitive 
bidding scheme
13 October 2008 daily Increasing FX-swap 
market liquidity 
decreased due to lowered 
partner limits
O/N FX swap standing facility 
providing euro
16 October 2008 daily Increasing euro liquidity 
in the domestic FX-swap 
market
Swiss franc liquidity-providing 
one-week, fi xed price FX swap 
tenders
2 February 2009 daily Increasing Swiss franc 
liquidity in the domestic 
FX-swap market
Euro liquidity-providing 
six-month EUR/HUF FX swap 
tenders
2 March 2009 daily Increasing long-term euro 
liquidity of the domestic 
credit institutions
Domestic credit institutions undertaking to keep 
at least constant at its 31 December 2008 value or 
increase their outstanding domestic corporate lending, 
after adjusting for exchange rate eff ects, on a quarterly 
basis from the second quarter of 2009 until the end 
of 2009, while the 2009 average of their net foreign 
liabilities, after adjusting for exchange rate eff ects, does 
not fall below the amount outstanding on 31December 
2008. Institutions also undertake to draw new foreign 
liabilities and/or reduce their foreign obligations,after 
adjusting for exchange rate eff ects, at least up to the 
amount of the swap-line in 2009.
In order to enhance forint liquidity, the Monetary Council
decided to reduce the reserve ratio to 2% in November, while
maintaining the measures adopted in October. In January the
Bank broadened the range of counterparties eligible to
participate in its six-month, variable-rate collateralised loan
tenders, and expanded the range of eligible collateral
accepted in lending to banks in a series of steps. The Bank has
added two new facilities to its existing policy instruments, in
order to alleviate foreign currency liquidity problems. First,
from February it provides Swiss franc liquidity in exchange
for euros by conducting one-week EUR/CHF swap
transactions with credit institutions subject to reserve
requirements. The provision of Swiss franc liquidity has been
facilitated by a temporary EUR/CHF swap agreement
concluded with the Swiss National Bank. Second, from 
2 March 2009 domestic credit institutions have access to a
six-month EUR/HUF swap facility providing euro liquidity.
With the introduction of the new instrument, the Bank’s
intention is to stimulate corporate lending and help banks to
have access to longer-term funding.
The regained confidence among banks is confirmed by the
fact that the primary liquidity reallocation is once again
fundamentally performed in the unsecured forint interbank
market. While turnover was relatively small in recent months
compared to previous months, it should be noted that this
can primarily be explained by excess liquidity most market
participants currently have; therefore, dependency on this
market is rather low at a system level. In another positive
sign, simultaneous recourse to the overnight deposit and
lending facilities of the MNB came to a halt, while demand
for longer-term lending facilities has gradually declined as
well. 
As frictions regarding forint liquidity subsided, foreign
currency liquidity conditions started to improve as well.
Largely contributing to this improvement, fears that the
foreign parent banks of domestic credit institutions would
not come to the aid of their subsidiaries if the FX swap
market dried up have proved unfounded. On the contrary;
non-resident owners in fact stepped up to assist their
subsidiaries more than ever, acting as counterparties in FX
swap contracts. In the last few months of the year the
number of contracts made within the bank group (typically
directly with the parent bank) increased substantially,
resulting in a higher ratio of owner-held stocks within the
net FX swap holdings of domestic banks. More active
participation of parent banks mitigated the rollover risks on
the FX swap holdings of domestic banks, thus these banks
appear to have a largely sufficient access to foreign
exchange liquidity. 
In another positive sign, following the drought in October,
the share of non-residents in the FX swap turnover rose to
pre-October levels by January. Moreover, implied forint
yields increased significantly following the negative values
observed in October, and while they are slightly still below
the interest rate corridor, they are close to it. Recourse to the
two-way FX swap tender practically stopped, which means
that the previous typical problem of banks not being able to
trade with each other because of reduced limits vis-à-vis each
other has been resolved. The banks no longer need the
intermediary services of the MNB to eliminate counterparty
risk. The one-way FX swap instrument was used almost
continuously up to the end of January; however, recourse to
this facility became scarce in February. Nonetheless, the
participation of the MNB in providing euro liquidity is still
needed and normal operations have not been resumed as of
yet. Reduced value of the average maturity and the
predominance of very short-term deals in trading also
support this assumption. As a negative development, due to
the substantial weakening of the exchange rate, rolling over
foreign exchange swap holdings of the same size takes up a
significantly higher portion of the banks’ forint liquidity
(known as the ‘margin call effect’). 
On the whole, processes in the government securities market
indicate mixed trends. Measures of the ÁKK to reduce the
supply of government papers, auctions conducted by the
MNB for the purchase of government securities and the
purchases made by primary distributors under an agreement
with the MNB all contributed to the initial improvement of
market functioning. Favourable entry opportunities resulting
from the expected decreasing interest rate path arising from
the cycle of interest rate cuts launched by the MNB may have
contributed to the return of non-resident investors to the
domestic government security market in January. The total
value of forint government securities non-residents
purchased exceeded HUF 200 billion. The major part of this
growth resulted from secondary market bond purchases,
while a smaller but still significant part was related to the
auction demand for discount Treasury bills. After the
considerable weakening in the forint exchange rate and the
reduction in expectations regarding further rate cuts, during
the second half of the period non-residents began to sell
forint government securities again. 
Reflecting the recovery of demand, in the first part of the
period the yields on government securities substantially
declined from the extremely high levels recorded in
November; however, a global deterioration in investor
sentiment resulted in rises in yields from the middle of
January. As a result yields rose to almost as a high level as
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they had topped in November. In December and January
short-term primary issues were sold against the backdrop of
increasing demand and decreasing yields. Demand at the
auctions proved to be sufficient in most of the cases at the
end of the period, too; however rising yields were present at
the primary markets as well. In February the Government
Debt Agency conducted successful government bond auctions
of three series with low offered amount, aimed to test
investors’ appetite for Treasury bonds. However, despite the
success of the sales, one of the key questions for the
upcoming months remained whether the market is robust
enough for the resumption of regular bond issues.
While there has been a significant overall improvement in the
functionality of domestic financial markets since the last
Report, normal business operations have not been completely
restored. There is less inconsistency in the yield levels of
certain markets; therefore, the information content of yields
became more reliable. Central bank measures largely
contributed to a more efficient orientation of market yields.
At the same time, the liquidity of most market segments is
still below the levels observed in the periods prior to the
turbulence in October.
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND LENDING
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Looking at the developments in monetary conditions, it has
become increasingly obvious that ‘classic indices’ such as real
exchange rates and real interest rates do not completely
reflect the tightness of monetary conditions. While the
former were relaxed during the previous period,
developments in the non-price factors of lending
undoubtedly point to a tightening of conditions.
The forward-looking real interest rate fell markedly from its
historic high recorded in November, due to the unexpectedly
steep decline in the nominal yield level, which surpassed that
of inflation expectations. The index rose to record heights
following the extraordinary interest rate increase in October;
however, as the cycle of rate cuts was launched, and the
expected interest rate path was overwritten by central bank
measures in November, the nominal short-term yield level
declined significantly. The value of the real interest rate is
still over 6%, which is well above the long-term average.
The nominal forint exchange rate continues to determine
developments in the real exchange rate, and overall it
significantly depreciated in recent months in an increasingly
volatile environment. Regarding the period elapsed since the
last Report, developments in the forint exchange rate
occurred in two stages. From the end of November to the
beginning of January, the exchange rate was reasonably
stable, moving within the boundaries of a relatively narrow
band. Subsequently, reflecting the deterioration of market
sentiment regarding the CEE region and following the shifts
in the exchange rates of other currencies in the region from
the end of January, the forint exchange rate climbed to a level
of around EUR/HUF 300, as a result of several waves of
weakening. Although the level of inflation in Hungary
exceeded that of the euro area, the extreme weakening of the
nominal exchange rate significantly over-compensated the
real appreciation effect of the positive inflation differential,
and overall it lead to a substantial real depreciation again. 
While developments in the real interest rate and the real
exchange rate pointed to the loosening of monetary
conditions, the impact of tightening credit standards and the
shrinking of the credit supply have become obvious: in the
last few months foreign currency lending decreased
significantly in both the household and the corporate
segments. Foreign exchange liquidity problems and the risks
the financial sector faced proved to be particularly
devastating in the case of loans denominated in Swiss franc:
the supply of franc loans and the stock of new lending
suffered a steep fall in the last few months of the year. This
is the most obvious manifestation of the tightening of
monetary conditions.
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2.4  Developments in monetary conditions
Chart 2-7
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Developments in the forint/euro exchange rate
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Bank lending activity declined markedly in the last quarter.
While the decline in bank lending helps reduce the external
financing requirement of the economy as it decreases
domestic consumption, it has an adverse effect on economic
prospects through several channels. Thus developments in
corporate lending play a crucial role. On the one hand, when
the financing of corporate investment comes to a halt, it puts
a downward pressure on the future growth prospects of the
economy. On the other hand, if firms fail to obtain even the
required working capital loans (or their existing working
capital loans are not rolled over), it may jeopardise the
financing of their production, which in turn may reduce the
short-term performance of the economy. In addition,
declining household borrowing reduces household
consumption as well, which also has a negative impact on
economic growth. 
In the last quarter of 2008 lending activity of banks
dropped back significantly both in the corporate and in the
retail segment. Corporate loans continued to grow in 2008
until September, albeit at a slower pace. However, in
October and in November the volume of corporate loans
stagnated, then dropped off sharply by nearly HUF 160
billion in December (the value excludes exchange rate
effects, see the chart below). This decline was caused
partially by the bigger than seasonally usual fall of short-
term loans, and by the omitted end-of-the-year rise of long-
term investment loans. Thus the seasonally adjusted
negative net flow in December is shared in a ratio of 45%-
55% between changes in the short-term and in the long-
term loans, respectively (although the non-adjusted figures
only show the fall of short-term loans). However, in
January net flow in corporate loans was slightly positive,
due to a small increase in short-term loans. 
Even an overall evaluation of the last quarter of 2008
indicates that net lending to the household sector dropped
substantially; a review of monthly data shows more obviously
how sharp the decline really was. The HUF 25 billion net
lending recorded in December (excluding exchange rate
effects) is lower than any value observed in any month over
the last four years. In January net lending continued to
diminish.
In December there was a clear shift in FX lending from Swiss
franc to the euro. This implies that some part of net lending
certainly stems from loan applications after the great
tightening of lending criteria in October. For the first time
since December 2002, the total stock of consumer credit
declined, although growth recovered slightly in January. In
line with the trends observed in previous years, the total
stock of forint loans continued to decline, both in the housing
segment and in consumer credit. In other words, despite
increasing exchange rate fluctuations, households continued
to prefer foreign currency-based products because of the
large difference between forint and foreign currency interest
rates. 
In summary, economic agents significantly adjusted their
behaviour in the midst of a financial crisis. Reasons associated
with loan supply and demand equally played a role in these
changes. On the supply side, the declining risk appetite of
banks led to a more conservative lending policy than before.
This is confirmed by the fact that several credit institutions
introduced markedly tighter loan conditions in the areas of
both household and corporate lending. On the side of loan
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2.5  Decline in bank lending
Chart 2-9
Net quarterly growth of the corporate loans of the
domestic bank sector, excluding exchange rate
effects
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
0
3
 Q
1
0
3
 Q
2
0
3
 Q
3
0
3
 Q
4
0
4
 Q
1
0
4
 Q
2
0
4
 Q
3
0
4
 Q
4
0
5
 Q
1
0
5
 Q
2
0
5
 Q
3
0
5
 Q
4
0
6
 Q
1
0
6
 Q
2
0
6
 Q
3
0
6
 Q
4
0
7
 Q
1
0
7
 Q
2
0
7
 Q
3
0
7
 Q
4
0
8
 Q
1
0
8
 Q
4
0
8
 Q
3
0
8
 Q
4
HUF Bn
Net flow, short Net flow, long
Total Seasonally adjusted
Chart 2-10
Net monthly growth of the household loans of the
domestic bank sector, excluding exchange rate
effects
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demand, a looming recession must have prompted firms and
households to restrain or postpone their high value
expenditures. 
According to our expectations, the decline in lending
activity may continue in 2009: available information
indicates that several banks aim to reduce risk, curtail
dependence on external funds, and decrease loan-to-deposit
ratios in their business plans for this year. As a consequence,
their loan portfolio should not exceed its current level in
general, and some banks may in fact streamline some of
their portfolio. 
It is reasonable to assume that credit institutions will initially
attempt to cut back their activities in the least profitable
credit segments, as well as in areas where their contractual
obligations most allow it. It is important to note however,
that credit activity in different sectors of the economy also
strongly depends on credit demand. Based on our first
assumption, the decline will affect household lending to a
lesser extent than the corporate portfolio. Based on our
second assumption, restrained credit supply will primarily
affect working capital loans in the corporate segment, which
have a shorter maturity (3 to 4 months on average); as these
loans expire, the banks can eliminate them very quickly by
not renewing them, whereas investment loans are more
difficult to terminate due to contractual obligations. This
latter effect however is counteracted by the strongest
decrease in loan demand at longer maturities, as a result of a
cut-back in investment demand.
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3  Inflation and real 
economy outlook

Beside the usual basic assumptions, the forecast assumes that
the fiscal measures announced on February 16 will come into
effect.
5
Regarding the economic outlook we expect a
downturn of the Hungarian economy in the upcoming two
years. Inflation may rise to near 5% temporarily, due to the
impact of the tax increases, followed by disinflation from
2010 H2. Excluding the direct impact of tax increases,
inflation is likely to remain below the medium-term target in
both 2009 and 2010.
6
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In line with the practice adopted in the previous issues of the Report, we
peg our forecast on certain fixed assumptions regarding the expected
path of the base rate, the EUR/HUF exchange rate and oil prices. We
fixed the central bank base rate at 9.5%, which reflects the level to
which it was lowered on 19 January. As regards the other variables, we
assume that the average value of the 4 working weeks between 19
January and 13 February will continue to apply. This has resulted in a
EUR/HUF exchange rate representing an over 12 percentage point
lower exchange rate relative to the November assumption. There has
also been a strong shift in global oil prices, which expressed in USD are
now approximately 35% lower than our last assumptions. Accordingly,
our assumption for crude oil prices expressed in forints is – despite a
weaker exchange rate path – nearly 30% lower for 2009 and over 20%
for 2010 than our basic assumption in November.
Box 3-1: The basic assumptions of our forecast 
Table 3-1
Changes in the basic assumptions of the forecast compared with the November Report*
November 2008 February 2008 Change compared with November (%)
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
Central bank base rate 
(per cent)** 11.5 11.5 11.5 10 9.5 9.5 -1.5 -2.0 -2.0
HUF/EUR 250.4 257.9 257.9 251.5 289.7 290.6 0.4 12.3 12.7
USD/EUR (cent) 147.5 133.5 133.5 147.1 129.7 129.5 -0.3 -2.8 -3.0
BRENT oil price (USD/barrel) 101.8 80.7 86.7 97.2 49.4 57.9 -4.5 -38.7 -33.3
BRENT oil price (EUR/barrel) 68.1 60.4 64.9 64.6 38.1 44.7 -5.2 -36.9 -31.2
BRENT oil price (HUF/barrel) 17,052 15,584 16,751 16,239 11,047 12,983 -4.8 -29.1 -22.5
* Annual averages, based on the monthly average exchange rate of the 20 working days precedeing 13th February 2009 and the crude oil futures
price.
** End-of-year values based on constant interest rate assumption, the change compared to November is presented in percentage points.
5 See details in Box 3-2.
6 Our forecasts are based on information available up to 5 p.m. on 16 February 2009.
In our forecast – similarly to the November Report – three
significant factors determine trends in the macroeconomic
path. Global business activity, domestic lending and the
impact of fiscal measures. Overall, we envisage a path that
is less favourable than it used to be in the case of the first
two factors. As regards the fiscal measures, they will lead
to a contraction in aggregate demand on the forecast
horizon.
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3.1  We expect a period of protracted downturn
Our forecast assumes that the fiscal measures announced on February 16
will come into effect. However, we used only those measures in our
calculations that are sufficiently detailed to have their macroeconomic
and fiscal effects judged. All in all, for 2010 nearly HUF 200 bn non-specific
measures were not taken into consideration. The measures partly serve
the budget adjustment in the short run, and partly the improvement of
the longer run sustainability of public finances. The following section
provides a brief summary of the major effect mechanisms.
On the revenue side, the objective of the restructuring of taxation is to
improve competitiveness while maintaining tax revenues. Employer
contributions will be cut back by a considerable 5%. Simultaneously,
taxes on consumption (VAT and excise duties) will be raised. In itself, the
transformation of personal income taxation will have a zero net effect,
as raising the lowest income tax rates is only possible through
abolishing tax breaks. Our model calculations reveal that a
rearrangement of taxation will be beneficial to long-term growth:
labour demand will be boosted by the lower tax burden on wages.
However, no positive effects will be discernible in the near term, our
forecast horizon, as they will be diluted by lower demand due to tax
increases and measures to cut spending.
In addition to increases in indirect taxes, household consumption will
be curbed by a cut-back of transfers to households (stricter eligibility
criteria for gas price and district heating subsidies, inclusion of family
benefits in the tax base and changes in the pension indexation rules).
Furthermore, the general government-related measures of the austerity
package, e.g. a reduction in agricultural subsidies and a cap on
spending by public institutions, will also curb government
consumption and investment spending.
Thus overall it is safe to assume that, although the government’s fiscal
measures will boost growth in the long run, the negative growth effects
will dominate in 2009 and 2010. Inflation will rise significantly due to
these measures in both years, with an aggregate increase amounting to
2.5% of the price level over the two years.
Box 3-2: The macroeconomic effect of the fiscal measures
Table 3-2
Government measures quantified in the forecast
Revenues (HUF bn) 2009 2010
Reduction of employers’ contribution -81 -281
PIT reductions -40 -192
Abolishng tax-free benefits 215
Tax on capital -2 -43
Taxes on consumption 123 288
Total 0 -13
Expenditures  (HUF bn) 2009 2010
Household transfers -17 -121
Government consumption and investment -93 -123
Transfers in kind -30 -30
Other -63 -57
Total -203 -331
As to external demand, the economic downturn experienced
by Hungary’s main export partners may approximate 2%,
and we expect only a slow recovery for 2010. This will
inevitably entail a marked fall in export sales this year. We do
not anticipate any significant growth in the household loan
portfolio in 2009. Only in 2010 will it rebound and edge up
to the levels of 2000 and 2001, when lending activity was
fairly moderate. By contrast, net corporate borrowing may
experience negative growth throughout the year, with
lending only slowly taking off in 2010.
Sectoral trends – a sharp fall in industrial output, confidence
indexes bottoming out, adverse trends in market services and
the construction industry – all suggest recession. A decline in
income and more stringent lending standards will likely
dampen investment and consumer spending in the case of all
major domestic agents.
In sum, both external and internal growth factors point to
rapid recession in the short run. Recovery is most likely to
commence in late 2009 and early 2010. In respect of external
business activity, recovery in the euro area hinges on the
success of economic policy interventions designed to boost
demand, while major domestic factors facilitating the
recovery are a new take-off in lending. Overall, the economic
downturn may be around 3.5% in 2009, which is likely to be
followed by some minor decline in 2010.
Hungary’s export sales will continue to be determined by its
major export partners’ increasingly dismal outlook for an
upturn in business activity. The global recession is expected
to lead to a significant decline in GDP or a marked slowdown
of GDP growth in both developed and emerging economies.
The investment and the intermediate goods sectors, which
respond strongly to changes in the business cycle, are
particularly vulnerable to the slowdown in external demand.
As these sectors represent a major share in Hungary’s
exports, we expect that a fall in domestic export sales may be
even more pronounced than the contraction of Hungary’s
external markets. We witnessed a similar phenomenon
during the global downturn at the turn of the millennium.
Similarly to major international institutions, we also expect
global business activity to pick up from the end of this year,
which may help put the export-driven sectors back on the
growth trajectory, making them first among the domestic
sectors to experience this. It is worth noting that a forint
exchange rate that is below previous years’ averages and the
cut in employer’s social security contribution may improve
the price and cost competitiveness of Hungarian export
companies. Nevertheless, the extent to which these
companies will be able to take advantage of this in the short
run against a background of dwindling demand is still
uncertain.
As regards lending activity, we expect a procyclical banking
behaviour. Due to declining risk appetite, banks might cut
credit supply, which means that credit flows will decline
more than the demand for credit would justify it during the
recession.
The sudden tightening of lending standards may lead to a
decrease in both output and capital demand in the corporate
sector in the future through several channels. The drying up
of short-term, mainly working capital loans may jeopardise
the continuous operation of companies – mainly SMEs – that
rely heavily on this type of financing. As a slower global
economic activity may directly or indirectly through suppliers
adversely influence the demand of this sector, further
reduction in financing may easily increase the possibility of
the discontinuation of production and of bankruptcies. These
adverse impacts may be offset successfully by the more
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Chart 3-1
Economic forecast for Hungary’s major export
partners based on the EC’s current projection
(export shares of countries in parentheses)
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Chart 3-2
Difference between the annual export dynamics and
the annual growth of external demand
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efficient utilisation of EU support if, in line with the
government’s intention, the implementation of the projects
can be accelerated.
Given the difficulty of securing credit and an increasingly
bleak growth outlook, banks are expected to apply stricter
cost and non-cost type standards to the corporate
creditworthiness appraisal process, especially this year.
Simultaneously, deteriorating sales opportunities, lower
potential profits and cost reductions will urge the majority of
companies to postpone or discontinue capacity increasing
investments, which in turn may lead to lower demand for
loans. Stricter lending standards and deteriorating
microeconomic prospects suggest that, except for the
implementation of a few large-scale investment projects
already announced (e.g. the construction of a Mercedes plant
in Kecskemét), corporate investment spending will decrease
over the entire forecast period.
The only favourable stimulus for total economy investment in
the years to come may be investment by the broad
government sector through successful applications for EU
funds. Although the projects financed from EU funds have
hitherto failed to truly boost investment, the government’s
current intention suggests that special emphasis will be put on
the implementation of these projects in the coming years.
Households’ behaviour will continue to be affected by
deteriorating labour market conditions, increasingly tight
lending, government measures and a temporary increase in
inflation. Companies in the private sector may respond to the
rapidly deteriorating profit conditions by reducing staff levels
and insisting on wage levels significantly lower than before
(or which even fall in nominal terms). Although based on the
budget for 2009 part of 13th month salaries will continue to
be granted in the public sector, nominal wages will decrease
by approximately 6% due to a moratorium on the payment
of bonuses. Although we expect an acceleration of gross
nominal wages in 2010, much of the increase (more than 4%)
is due to abolishing tax-exempted benefits. Our assumption is
that in the adverse conjunctural environment the tax burden
of the previously tax-free benefits will be borne by
employees. Thus, all in all, despite the loosening of the
personal income tax rules the nominal income of households
will not increase. Furthermore, government measure through
a cut-back of nominal transfers and increasing inflation will
reduce real income. 
These two effects will combine to lead to a substantial
reduction in households’ real income in 2009 and in 2010. As
in the short run credit financing for consumer and investment
spending is also becoming increasingly hard to obtain,
alongside dwindling income, a fall in the consumption and
investment demand of a large share of households may be
sharper than that in real income. This trend is the opposite of
what was seen during the 2006 adjustment, and is more
reminiscent of the developments following the tightening of
housing subsidies in 2004. We expect that this year, as a
result of this process, there will be some visible correction in
financial savings, which have been falling since 2005. This
will also improve the external position of the Hungarian
economy.
The extent of the correction will be determined mostly by a
fall in household borrowing. We expect only a minor
increase in the financial holdings of households. We base the
latter assumption on two opposing factors. While in an
environment of falling real income, moderation in financial
holdings would be consistent with households’ consumption
smoothing, increased caution warranted by a deteriorating
labour market situation should result in an increase in
financial savings. Savings are rather concentrated. Only a
minority of households have liquid assets. The savings of
most households are regulated by long-term contracts (e.g.
pension funds savings, insurance policies) whose liquidation
would be rather costly; therefore, of the two impacts we
consider the latter will prevail. Accordingly, we expect
financial holdings to decline further for only a quarter or
two, and even then only to a limited extent. As part of the
adjustment process, the sector’s investment spending may –
as a proportion of disposable income – reach historic lows.
Overall, we expect a marked economic downturn in 2009,
which may be followed by a further moderate reduction in
economic activity in 2010 as well. The most important
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Chart 3-3
Trends in the use of household income 
(As a proportion of disposable income)
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cause of the downturn is a reduction in household
consumption, total economy investment spending and
export sales. Nevertheless, due to a significant drop in
domestic import demand, the contribution of net exports to
growth may, despite the unfavourable sales opportunities
abroad, remain positive over the entire forecast period. This
will significantly improve the sustainability of the external
balance of the Hungarian economy. A kick-start around late
2009 and early 2010 is likely to come from export sales
boosted by a moderate recovery of external business activity
and domestic demand invigorated by a new take-off in
lending in.
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Table 3-3
Growth projection 
(Annual growth)
2007 2008 2009 2010
Actual Nowcast Forecast
Household consumption expenditure 0.7 0.3 -5.1 -1.6
Social transfers in kind   -11.5 3.5 -0.3 0.0
Final consumption of households -1.7 0.8 -4.2 -1.3
Final consumption of government -2.8 -0.8 -2.6 -1.5
Total consumption -1.9 0.5 -4.0 -1.3
Gross fixed capital formation 0.9 -1.4 -7.1 -0.5
Changes in inventories
Gross capital formation  1.4 0.4 -6.1 -0.8
Domestic use -0.9 0.5 -4.5 -1.2
Export 15.9 4.8 -6.0 4.8
Import 13.1 4.7 -7.1 4.2
GDP 1.1 0.6 -3.5 -0.5
The adjustment process in the corporate sector warranted by
a further deterioration in the sector’s profitability will remain
dominant in the labour market. In an unfavourable
macroeconomic environment, lower profitability urges
companies to reduce their staff levels and wage dynamics.
Although experience shows that wages take longer to adjust,
given the current situation adjustment is very likely to
accelerate and the wage channel will play an increasingly
significant role in labour market adjustment. 
In 2010, due to the government measures, a statistical effect
will also be reflected in gross wages. As the net value of the
hitherto tax-exempted benefits (e.g. meal and holiday
vouchers) will count towards wages, wage indexes will grow
by approximately 4%. Even so, we do not think this will
affect wage costs in any way, i.e. employers will not
compensate their employees for the increasing tax burden
imposed on them, because due to lower income tax rates, the
net income of employees will not fall. This latter effect will
approximately compensate for the reduction of the personal
income tax rate. 
Due to possible further lay-offs, the number of those
employed in the private sector may decrease by close to 2%
in both 2009 and 2010. Thus, although the government
measures described in Box 3-2 will in the longer run increase
labour demand, only few positive labour market impacts will
materialise before 2010. Experience suggests that only part of
the labour laid off remains registered as unemployed in the
labour market. A significant part will exit the labour market
and become economically inactive. The foregoing
notwithstanding, we expect a sharp rise in unemployment
over the entire forecast period.
Simultaneously, the negative output gap – which curbs wage
increases – will also be felt to an increasing extent in wage
dynamics. In addition to a number of economic impacts, due
to robust statistical effects, wage growth in the private sector
will be significantly lower than earlier. Of the former effects,
in particular the adjustment necessitated by dwindling
demand, employers’ improved bargaining position due to a
higher unemployment rate, an environment of lower
inflation and the so-called demonstrative effect brought
about by nominal wage reductions in the public sector are
worth mentioning. Furthermore, output during a shorter (4
rather than 5-day) working week also favours lower wage
dynamics. Although corporate adjustment through the
number of hours worked can be regarded as quantitative
adjustment, if the properties of our statistical tests that
monitor – mainly monthly average wages – are taken into
account, the latter impact will also be reflected in a lower rate
of wage growth.
In the case of the public sector, we assume that labour market
processes will be consistent with the government’s intentions
over the entire forecast period. This translates into
unchanged staff levels in the public sector, while as regards
wages, after a nominal decrease this year, there will be some
minor increase in real wages in 2010, in parallel with the
private sector.
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3.2  A further decrease in employment and
stronger wage adjustment
Chart 3-4
Components of the unit labour costs of the private
sector
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The expected path of inflation will be affected significantly and
directly by the government’s tax-increasing measures, in
addition to economic interconnections and changes in our basic
assumptions. Therefore, in the following section we will discuss
the impacts of these measures in detail.
Over the short run, provided that our basic assumptions apply,
we expect a further mild reduction in inflation until mid-2009.
A EUR/HUF exchange rate that is 12% weaker than the one in
our November projection points to higher inflation over the
entire forecast period. The impact of the forint’s exchange rate
will be dampened by lower imported inflation and the significant
drop in prices in the global commodity markets over the past few
months. In line with our previous forecasts, we expect a marked
disinflationary impact of an envisaged reduction in domestic
demand over the entire forecast period.
A significantly negative domestic output gap, which mitigates
inflation, may make itself felt especially in the items of core
inflation. The inflation of market services was consistently 6%-
7% for several years. Disinflation, which started late last year
and continued this January, may persist and is expected to gain
further strength in 2010. In addition to demand effects
mitigating inflation, trends in the wage dynamics of the sector
may be a key determinant in this process. The more flexibly
wages in the service sector adjust to productivity – which will
probably be rather weak over the entire forecast period – the
faster disinflation may occur.
In line with a rapid fall in commodity and energy prices over the
past quarters, we expect further correction in the prices of
processed food in 2009 H1, to be followed from 2010 by a slow
rise in the prices of these goods, due to a slow increase in the
prices of unprocessed foods.
As a combined outcome of the above trends, inflation may fall
below the medium-term target as early as in 2009 and fall even
further, below 2% in 2010. This is adequately underpinned by
expected trends in the price index, net of tax changes, which is
yet again in the focus of our analysis.
7
However, the tax increase will accelerate inflation from mid-
2009. Of the announced government measures, the one that will
exert the most significant impact is raising the standard VAT rate
from 20% to 23%. This tax hike, which will affect
approximately 93% of the entire consumer basket, will
according to our estimates increase the current level of inflation
by approximately 1.8%. As a result, around 75%-80% of the
technical impact will be reflected in the price index. Experience
based on past VAT rate increases reveals that it is only a few
months before producers and retailers pass on the effect of the
VAT rate increases to customers. As a result, a major part of this
impact will already be reflected in the CPI in Q3, i.e.
immediately after the VAT rate increases in July. The increase of
excise duties on alcoholic beverages, tobacco and fuels will,
according to our estimates, increase the price level by a further
0.3%. In addition to these two impacts of tax increases, spending
cut measures may – through administered prices – increase
inflation by another approximately 0.5%.
Based on macroeconomic trends and the government measures,
our projection is for annual average inflation to stand above
3.5% in 2009 and slightly below 3% in 2010. As regards within
year inflation, it is worth noting that inflation, which stood at
3.1% in January, may decline slightly further in the short run;
however, due to the tax increases, price indexes are likely to
remain over 4% for nearly a year from Q3. Annual indexes will
only drop below the inflation target in 2010 H2.
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3.3  Temporarily higher inflation due to tax
increases
7 Similar to changes in VAT rates in the past, the exclusion of the impact of tax increases from the CPI is a major methodological issue. Our calculations show that not
the entire impact of taxes is reflected in consumer prices. Therefore, it stands to reason that if we exclude the impact of the tax increases 100%, we could easily
undershoot inflation, which is relevant in an economic sense.
Chart 3-5
CPI projection*
(Annual growth)
* In the case of the CPI net of VAT, we have taken into consideration the
impact of the feed-through of the VAT rate and excise duty increases to the
CPI rather than their full technical impact.
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The main causes of uncertainty in our current projection are
external demand, lending activity and global market turmoil.
As regards external demand, there is a real risk that global
business activity is facing a downturn that will be deeper and
more protracted than our baseline expectations. Under this
scenario, the import demand of Hungary’s major foreign trade
partners will continue to decrease in 2010. Such a protracted
global downturn would affect economic growth through lower
export sales mainly in 2010. Inflation would be lower, due to
adverse trends in business activity. This might be reduced
further by the disinflationary impact of global commodity
prices, which are most likely to continue to fall.
Trends in lending standards continue to represent a
substantial risk in our projection. In our judgement, the
conditions of borrowing and the unfavourable income
position of the borrowers may, for as long as the entire
forecast period, lead to less dynamic lending than assumed in
the baseline scenario. It cannot be ruled out that both net
household and net corporate borrowing may remain negative
over the next two years. This could especially affect this
year’s figures. Its disinflationary effect would materialise
mostly in 2010.
The impact of the protracted turmoil in the global financial
markets on macroeconomic trends has also become more
accentuated in Hungary over the past few months. From a
forward-looking perspective, a sudden significant
deterioration in Hungary’s risk assessment may, provided
that interest rates remains unchanged, amplify upside risks to
inflation.
Overall, based on the risks presented above, risks to the
baseline scenario for economic growth are to the downside,
while those to inflation are slightly tilted to the upside.
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3.4  Inflation and growth risks
Chart 3-6
Fan chart of the inflation projection
(Annual growth)
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Chart 3-7
Fan chart of the GDP projection
(Annual growth)
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2007 2008 2009 2010
Actual Projection
November Current November Current November Current
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation1,** 6.0 5.2 5.1 2.7 – 3.0 4.2 1.3 – 1.8 2.5
Consumer price index** 8.0 6.2 6.1 3.1 – 3.4 3.7 1.5 – 1.9 2.8
Economic growth
External demand (GDP-based) 3.8 2.1 2.3 (-0.4) – 0.3 -1.2 (-0.2) – 1.5 0.8
Impact of fiscal demand2,*** -3.7 -1.8 -1.8 (-0.6) – (-0.1) 0.0 (-0.5) – 0.3 -0.3
Household consumer expenditure 0.7 0.4 – 0.5 0.3 (-3.6) – (-1.1) -5.1 0.4 – 1.2 -1.6
Fixed capital formation 1.5 (-0.9) – (-0.5) -1.4 (-3.5) – 1.1 -7.1 (-0.2) – 2.8 -0.5
Domestic absorption -0.9 1.2 0.5 (-2.7) – (-0.4) -4.5 0.2 – 1.2 -1.2
Export 15.9 6.2 – 6.4 4.8 0.0 – 1.6 -6.0 2.0 – 5.8 4.8
Import 13.1 6.6 – 6.7 4.7 (-1.2) – 1.5 -7.1 1.8 – 4.9 4.2
GDP 1.1 1.0 – 1.1 0.6 (-1.7) – (- 0.2) -3.5 0.5 – 2.0 -0.5
Current account deficit3
As a percentage of GDP 6.4 7.0 – 7.2 7.9 4.0 – 4.9 3.9 4.3 – 4.4 4.5
EUR billions 6.5 7.7 – 7.8 8.3 4.3 – 5.4 3.6 4.8 – 4.9 4.2
External financing requirement3
As a percentage of GDP 5.3 5.7 – 5.8 6.8 1.8 – 2.8 2.1 1.7 – 1.8 1.7
Labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings4,8 8.0 8.7 8.3 0.9 – 1.4 0.8 4.4 – 5.6 6.5
Whole-economy employment5,** -0.1 -1.2 -1.2 (-1.3) – (-0.9) -2.0 (-1.8) – (-0.8) -1.8
Private sector gross average earnings6,8 9.1 (8.5) 9.3 (8.5) 9.2 (8.3) 5.0 – 5.7 4.0 4.3 – 5.5 6.5
Private sector employment5,** 0.9 -1.1 -1.0 (-1.4) – (-0.9) -2.4 (-2.2) – (-1.0) -2.3
Private sector unit labour cost5,7 4.0 4.6 6.5 4.7 6.4 2.0 – 2.8 2.0
Household real income* -2.2 0.5 – 0.7 -1.2 (-0.6) – (-1.8) -1.8 1.3 – 1.8 -1.2
Table 3-4
Changes in our projections compared to November 2008
1
For technical reasons, this indicator may temporarily differ from the index published by the CSO; over the long term, however, it follows a similar
trend. 
2
Calculated from the so-called augmented (SNA) balance; a negative value means a narrowing of aggregate demand. 
3
Due to the high level of Net Errors and Omissions (NEO) the current account deficit/external financing requirement for the 2004-2007 period may be
higher than suggested by official figures. 
4
Calculated on a cash-flow basis.
5
According to the CSO LFS data.
6
According to the original CSO data. The numbers in brackets refer to wages excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses. 
7
Private sector unit labour cost calculated with a wage index excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses.
8
In 2010, the abolition of tax-free benefits raises gross wages by 4.4%, if the government plans as known at the closing of this Report will materialize.
* MNB estimate.
** The 2008 figures of these time series are not forecasts, but actual data.
*** Fiscal impact on demand does not contain the result of MNB for 2009 and 2010.
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Consumer Price Index (annual average growth rate, per cent)
MNB (February 2009) 8.0 6.1 3.7 2.8 -
Consensus Economics (January 2009)1 - - 1.6 – 2.6 – 3.5 2.4 – 2.7 – 3.2 -
OECD (November 2008) 8.0 6.4 3.6 3.2 -
European Commission (January 2009) 7.9 6.1 2.8 2.2 -
IMF (November 2008)* 7.9 6.3 4.5 4.1 -
Reuters-survey (January 2009)1 - - 1.2 – 2.5 – 4.4 1.4 – 2.6 – 3.5 2.5 – 2.9 – 3.5
GDP (annual growth rate, per cent)
MNB (February 2009) 1.1 0.6 -3.5 –0.5 -
Consensus Economics (January 2009)1 - - (–4.2) – (–2.4) – (–0.8) (–1.0) – 0.7 – 2.4 -
OECD (November 2008) 1.1 1.4 –0.5 1.0 -
European Commission (January 2009) 1.1 0.9 –1.6 1.0 -
IMF (November 2008)* 1.1 1.8 –1.0 0.6 -
Reuters-survey (January 2009)1 - - (–3.0) – (–2.4) – (–1.3) 0.0 – 1.5 – 3.3 -
Current account deficit (percent of GDP)
MNB (February 2009) 6.4 7.9 3.9 4.5
OECD (November 2008) 6.4 6.1 6.1 5.4 -
European Commission (January 2009) 6.4 7.2 5.5 5.2 -
IMF (November 2008)* 6.4 6.2 2.0 1.5 -
Budget Deficit (ESA-95 method, percent of GDP)
MNB (February 2009) 5.0 3.4 2.9 3.3
Consensus Economics (January 2009)1 - - 2.5 – 2.7 – 3.0 2.0 – 2.5 – 3.0 -
OECD (November 2008) 5.0 3.4 3.6 3.5 -
European Commission (January 2009) 5.0 3.3 2.8 3.0 -
IMF (November 2008)* 4.9 3.4 2.5 2.0 -
Reuters-survey (January 2009)1 - - 2.4 – 2.7 – 3.4 1.8 – 2.6 – 4.0 -
Forecasts on the size of Hungary’s export markets (annual growth rate, per cent)
MNB (February 2009) 8.2 5.5 -4.9 1.5 -
OECD (November 2008)2,3 6.1 4.0 1.3 3.7 -
European Commission (January 2009)2,4 7.4 4.4 -1.8 1.3 -
IMF (November 2008)2 6.4 3.3 0.8 - -
Forecasts on the GDP growth rate of Hungary’s trade partners (annual growth rate, per cent)
MNB (February 2009) 3.8 2.3 -1.2 0.8 -
OECD (November 2008)2,3 3.5 2.0 0.0 1.7 -
European Commission (January 2009)2 3.6 2.2 -1.2 1.0 -
IMF (January 2009)2,** - 1.5 -1.9 0.7 -
Forecasts on the GDP growth rate of euro area (annual growth rate, per cent)
MNB (February 2009) 2.7 0.9 -2.1 0.4 -
OECD (November 2008) 2.6 1.0 -0.6 1.2 -
European Commission (January 2009) 2.7 0.9 -1.9 0.4 -
IMF (January 2009) 2.6 1.0 -2.0 0.2 -
Table 3-5
MNB basic forecast compared to other forecasts
The projections of the MNB are ‘conditional’, which means that they cannot always be directly compared with the projections of other institutions.
1
For Reuters and Consensus Economics surveys, in addition to the average value of the analysed replies (i.e. the medium value), we also indicate the
lowest and the highest values to illustrate the distribution of the data. 
2
Values calculated by the MNB; the projections of the named institutions for the
relevant countries are adjusted with the weighting system of the MNB, which is also used for the calculation of the bank’s own external demand indices.
Therefore, these figures may deviate from the figures published by the specified institutions. 
3
Since OECD did not publish any data on Romania, our
OECD forecast excludes Romania. 
4
The January 2009 forecast of the European Comission does not publish an import forecast for the United States, so
this figure does not contain the United States.
* The figures refer to the IMF Staff Report for Hungary, published in November 2008.
** The January 2009 IMF WEO does not contain a forecast for all countries, so in some cases we used country group projections.
Sources: Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts (Consensus Economics Inc. (London), January 2009); European Commission Economic Forecasts, January
2009; IMF World Economic Outlook (October 2008 and January 2009); Reuters survey (January 2009); OECD Economic Outlook (November 2008).
4  General government 
and external balance

As a result of the strong fiscal consolidation since 2006, the
deficit declined by around 6% of GDP between 2006 and
2008. Consequently, taking account of the private pension
fund adjustment, in 2008 Hungary met the Maastricht
criterion regarding fiscal deficit. If the measures announced
in February are fully implemented, the deficit may continue
to decline in 2009, with a high probability of it decreasing
below 3% of GDP. In 2010, however, we expect a slight
increase in the fiscal deficit, even taking into account the
realistically acceptable part of the package of measures
known so far. In the event that the plans not yet detailed are
also elaborated and implemented, an increase in the level of
deficit for 2010 may be avoided and sustaining a level of
deficit below 3% may become feasible. 
In 2008 the ESA deficit of the general government may have
been around 3.4%, which – due to methodological
differences – exceeds the forecast in the November Report.
The developments of the deficit of the state budget on a cash
basis met our expectations, although the settlement of the
amount received from the privatisation of MÁV Cargo
increased the accrual-based deficit.
8
Although the 2008 cash deficit was in line with our
expectations, its composition was different from our
forecast, and this projects unfavourable trends regarding the
developments in the deficit for 2009 and 2010. At end-
2008 we observed remarkable shortages mainly in
corporate tax and contributions revenues, which were
largely offset by one-off items, providing for a close-to-
target deficit. 
In 2009, as a result of the noted deterioration of the
macroeconomic path, we expect substantial shortages in tax
and contributions revenues. To offset this, on 16 February
the Prime Minister announced a series of measures aimed at
significantly reducing expenditures, including steps to
restructure the tax system. In 2009 disciplined financial
management is expected on the expenditure side, with
considerable restrictions on most items except pension
expenditures, where an increase is expected as a proportion
of GDP. On the revenue side, we expect a nominal decline in
the determining items as a consequence of the recession,
which will only be partly changed by the government’s tax
restructuring measures.
The cyclically adjusted general government balance reveals
that the economic environment already deteriorated the
balance slightly last year, and its extent is expected to
increase significantly this year. While the improvement in the
official deficit figures in 2009 is only slight, taking account of
the cyclical processes the picture of a much more definite
adjustment is emerging. The cyclically adjusted ESA-balance
can improve by more than 2% of GDP. 
In autumn 2008 the government set a new, lower deficit
target. To achieve it, the government introduced restrictive
measures in two steps. However, as a result of the
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4.1  Developments in the general government
balance
8 A preliminary ESA deficit figure is expected to be revealed in March; the balance of local governments and methodological issues may still alter it. Based on the
preliminary financial accounts, the financing requirement of the general government may have been around 3.1% of GDP in 2008. Based on this, we cannot exclude
the possibility that the final 2008 deficit figure will also be different from the preliminary estimate of 3.4%.
When preparing our previous forecast, we did not expect the privatisation revenue to be realised in 2008, thus the revenue left with MÁV could not spoil last year’s
balance, even as a fiscal transfer. However, after closing the forecast, the financial closure of the transaction still took place, which will probably completely burden
last year, although the final decision is expected only in March 2009.
2008 2009 2010
GFS balance -3.5 -3.2 -3.7
ESA balance -3.4 -2.9 -3.3
Augmented SNA balance -4.1 -4.7 -4.5
SNA primary balance -0.3 -0.4 -0.1
Fiscal demand effect -1.8 0.0 -0.3
Cyclical component -0.2 -1.9 -1.9
Table 4-1
Changes in the balance indicators of the general government
deterioration in macroeconomic developments, these
measures were virtually neutralised by the cycle’s negative
effect. This was followed by further measures in February,
which partially offset the increasing effect of lost revenues on
the deficit. As a result, the ESA balance of the general
government will improve in 2009 compared to 2008,
although in comparison with the deficit target of 2.6% set
earlier, a somewhat higher deficit of 2.9% is expected. 
The augmented SNA deficit indicator, which reflects the
effect of the government on the other sectors, is expected to
increase in 2009, mainly due to the increase in motorway
construction and the losses of the central bank. However, in
2010 mostly due to the ending of motorway construction we
expect a slight decrease in the SNA balance. The fiscal
demand effect (change in the primary SNA balance) showed
a significant tightening in 2008, will have a neutral effect in
2009 and we expect a further tightening in 2010, in contrast
to the official deficit indicator. 
4.1.1  CHANGES IN GENERAL
GOVERNMENT REVENUES
In 2008 the developments in budget revenues were basically
determined by a gradual deterioration of the macroeconomic
path. In particular, the amount collected from corporate tax
and contributions failed to meet expectations during the year,
but the effect of declining household consumption could be
slightly felt in consumption-related taxes in the last quarter.
At the same time, there was no fall in personal income tax,
presumed to be due to revenues related to non-wage type
incomes.
As part of the adjustment package announced by the Prime
Minister on 16 February, the tax system will also be
restructured. In the context of this restructuring, taxes and
contributions on labour will decrease, while taxes on
consumption will increase. In 2009 the reduction in
employer’s contributions and the easing of the personal
income tax system will be practically completely offset by a
rise in VAT and excise tax. In 2010, in addition to a further
cutback in wage taxation, taxation on capital will also be
slightly more favourable, which will again be offset by an
increase in taxes on consumption. As a result of these
changes, the tax wedge may narrow considerably, although
the total tax burden will remain largely unchanged.
Meanwhile, a reorganisation will take place: the tax burden
of households will rise significantly, while in parallel, the tax
burden of enterprises will fall. 
Compared to the targets of the budget act, general government
revenues may fall by more than HUF 300 billion in 2009 as a
result of the more unfavourable macroeconomic path. As for
the major state revenues, the last 10 years have not seen an
individual revenue item decline compared to the previous year,
even in nominal terms. By contrast, without the package of
measures and in line with the decline in tax bases, negative
growth indices for each important revenue item (personal
income tax, VAT, corporate tax, contributions) would have
developed for 2009. This negative trend already began in 2008
in the case of corporate tax (not including solidarity tax).
However, as a result of the changes in the tax system
announced in February, the dynamics of individual revenue
items will also change to some extent. As a consequence of the
increase in the tax rate, the growth index of VAT revenues may
already become positive in 2009, while revenues from
contributions and personal income tax may fall even more.
There will be no measures affecting corporate tax in 2009; the
steep decline may be fully considered as a result of the
deteriorating macroeconomic environment (Chart 4-1).
The indices presented in the chart combine both the effects
of the change in the macroeconomic path and the measures
related to the various individual revenue items. For example,
in 2003 the outstanding VAT revenue is basically the
consequence of the shift in the inter-annual timing of VAT
reimbursement, while the jump of corporate tax in 2006-07
is a result of the introduced solidarity tax. 
In 2010 a very high growth rate is expected for the corporate
tax, although this is mainly due to the raised tax rate, the
widening of the tax base and the narrowing of exemptions.
However, the abolition of the corporate solidarity tax will
offset the increase in corporate tax revenues. Consequently,
the overall taxation on capital will remain essentially
unchanged in 2010. Due to the annualised effect of raising
the rate, VAT revenues will also notably increase in nominal
terms in 2010, while a further, relatively slight drop is
expected in wage-related revenues, essentially due to the
effect of the measures. 
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Chart 4-1
Nominal growth rates of major revenue items
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4.1.2  CHANGES IN GENERAL
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
On 16 February the Prime Minister also announced
numerous measures aimed at reducing expenditures, which
– with the tax restructuring steps, which have a nearly zero
effect in net terms – may lead to the achievement of the
modified deficit target in 2009. Among the expenditure-
side government measures announced so far, our forecast
took account of the items which have been outlined in
adequate detail and can be realistically implemented on the
basis of the information available. The measures aim at
reducing transfers to households on the one hand, and
cutting the government’s consumption and investment
expenditures on the other. In 2009 approximately one half
of the expenditure decrease derives from falling
government consumption, while in 2010 the cutback of
transfers and government consumption will contribute to
the fall in deficit to a similar extent. 
In 2009 the latest series of measures will entail a cutback of
approximately HUF 200 billion on the expenditure side,
which can facilitate the achievement of the deficit target,
modified to 2.9%. For 2010 the proposals revealed so far and
elaborated in adequate detail amount to nearly HUF 350
billion. However, it is important to emphasise that the
government’s intention aims at a somewhat larger reduction
in expenditures, in the magnitude of HUF 500 billion, i.e. if
all planned measures are implemented, the extent of the
adjustment may be greater than the one taken into account in
the baseline scenario. 
Net expenditures of budgetary units
In 2008 net expenditures of budgetary units declined by
more than HUF 250 billion, a major part of which was
mainly due to the loss of or decline in items considered one-
off. Compared to the previous year, expenditure related to
motorway construction declined in 2008, and the Hungarian
Railways (MÁV) did not receive an extra capital allocation as
in 2007. These items altogether reduced expenditures by
nearly HUF 200 billion. Expenditures declined mainly as a
result of a fall in investment expenditures, while wage
expenditures remained at almost the same level and purchase
of goods and services increased. 
For 2009 the fiscal target is the further saving of over HUF 200
billion compared to the previous year. Its main components are
the expected nominal decline of around 6% in public sector
wages on the one hand, and on the other, motorway projects
are planned to be implemented under the PPP scheme in 2009,
i.e. practically only outside the budget. The former measure
means a shift in levels of expenditures, while the latter is the
spreading of a one-off high expense over the coming years in
the form of an availability fee. Compared to the target, the
February announcements represent a further reduction in
expenditures of budgetary units. First, a considerable part of
chapter expenditures has been blocked. Second, certain types
of subsidies will be reduced (gas price compensation,
agricultural subsidies). Third, as a result of restructuring the
tax and contributions system, the amount of wage type
expenditures of the general government will also automatically
decline. 
Overall, during 2008 and 2009 the expenditures of
budgetary organisations may decline by more than 2.5% of
GDP compared to the 2007 level, considered very high. For
2010 we forecast an essentially unchanged level of
expenditures. 
Pension expenditures
The dynamic increase in pension expenditures continued in
2008 and this trend is expected to continue at a decelerating
pace in 2009 and 2010, even taking into account the
measures presented in February. In contrast to the decline in
the net expenditure of budgetary units, which is another
major expenditure item of the state budget, pension
expenditures constitute a steadily increasing part of all
government expenditures (Chart 4-2).
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2009 2010
Financial transfers to households -17 -121
Government’s consumption and investment -93 -123
Transfers in kind -30 -30
Others -63 -57
Sum -203 -331
Table 4-2
The distribution of expenditure measures 
(HUF Bn)
Over the past 10 years nominal pension expenditures grew by
nearly 15% a year on average, which also significantly
increased expenditures as a proportion of GDP. In these
increases, in addition to the rises determined by the Swiss
indexation method, one-off measures also played a role: one-
off pension rises, introduction of the 13th month pension
payment, the pension correction programme, as well as the
replacement effect, which influences the composition of
pensioners. Pension expenditures increased by more than
10% in 2008; of the determining factors, both the price
index and the wage index played a major role.
Pursuant to the decisions of last autumn, 13th month pension
payments have been maximised for 2009, and the pension
correction programme will only continue as of September,
helping to decelerate the growth rate of pension
expenditures. However, no further step bringing forth any
significant fiscal effect will be taken in 2009. In 2010 the
modification of the Swiss index to indexation tied to
economic growth, termination of the 13th month pension
payment for new pensioners as well as other minor changes
may slightly rein in the increase in pension expenditures.
However, raising the legal retirement age – which could
represent a major contribution to the reduction of pension
expenditures – will be implemented gradually, only starting
from 2016, and changing the 13th month pension payment
also only facilitates the improvement of the balance of the
pension fund at a very slow pace. 
Interest expenditures
Compared to the previous year, in 2008 the interest
expenditures of the general government increased in both
nominal terms and as a proportion of GDP, mainly due to a
substantial increase in yields. In 2009 and 2010 the result of
the extensive restructuring in government debt funding will
be that the interest expenditures of the ÁKK (Government
Debt Management Agency) will not increase significantly
compared to last year on a cash basis. Foreign currency loans
received from international organisations (IMF, European
Commission, World Bank) markedly increased the share of
foreign currency debt within total debt, which directly
reduces the interest expenditures of the ÁKK through the
lower cost of funding. However, in parallel, as we already
highlighted it among the risks in the November Report, the
MNB’s interest income is deteriorating considerably through
the high interest expenditure on the stock of the two-week
MNB bonds, which is increasing significantly. This effect is
partially offset by the realised holding gain of the central
bank. In recent years the central bank managed to cover the
emerging losses from its accumulated profit reserve, but for
2009 and 2010 the central bank loss is expected to be
financed from the budget, which will appear in the deficit as
well. The settlement is performed in the year following the
year under review, but the magnitude of the settlement is
currently surrounded by great uncertainty, which essentially
depends on the factors influencing the size of the loss (price,
developments in the yield, timing of drawing down of credit,
etc.). For 2009 and 2010 the size of the additional deficit is
expected to be around 0.2 and 0.3% of GDP respectively,
which will appear in the fiscal deficit in 2010 and 2011.
4.1.3 RISKS SURROUNDING OUR
FORECAST
Similarly to the May 2008 issue of the Report, we have
prepared a fan chart which once again indicates the
uncertainty of the fiscal forecast. The fan chart contains the
risks hidden in the macroeconomic path and the non-political
ones additionally perceived by experts. 
The fan chart shows that the risks surrounding our baseline
projection are asymmetrical, and both the macroeconomic
and experts’ uncertainty point to trends of higher deficit for
both years. The skewness of the macroeconomic path is the
result of two contrasting effects in 2009 and 2010. The
downward asymmetry of GDP growth indicates a higher
deficit, while the upside risks to inflation can improve the
deficit path due to higher nominal revenues. The main
underlying reasons are the increase in budgetary units’
expenditures, which exceed the assumptions of the baseline
projection, and certain implementation risks related to not
yet specified measures. 
As for the expert items, although in the main scenario we
accept the vast majority of the measures announced in
February, for lack of statutory confirmation we must signal
that the implementation risk related to the measures is high.
For example, on the revenue side we see considerable
implementation risk in making fringe benefits which were
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Chart 4-2
Net expenditures of budgetary units and pension
expenditures 
(as a percentage of GDP)
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tax-exempted subject to taxation. The regulations regarding
fringe benefits which are at present exempted from taxation
(e.g. meal vouchers, holiday vouchers, etc.) have not changed
so far to make these benefits subject to taxation and payment
of contributions, and it might occur that the changes will only
apply to a part of the original complete range of tax-free
benefits. Consequently, the expected additional revenue from
this source may not be realised either. 
Our baseline projection takes into account a stability reserve
of 0.3% and 0.2% of GDP for 2009 and 2010, respectively,
i.e. in the event that the deficit target is exceeded, blocking
the reserve may facilitate the achievement of the target. 
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Chart 4-3
Fan chart illustrating the uncertainty surrounding
the fiscal deficit forecast
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Available data suggest a significant increase in the external
imbalance in 2008. According to the Q3 balance of payments
publication, the improvement in external balance came to a
halt at end-2007, and until 2008 Q3 the country’s financing
requirement increased again. Although a correction may have
started at the end of the year, the external financing
requirement – the combined current and the capital account
balance – may still have been around 6.8% of GDP at the
annual level.
The external equilibrium picture, which is even much more
unfavourable than our earlier forecast, is attributable to two
factors. On the one hand, the increase in the deficit on the
income balance exceeded our expectations, which partly
reflects the increasing costs of external funding.
9
Namely, the
data indicate that as a result of the financial crisis, domestic
economic agents can roll over their maturing debt only with
shorter maturities and at higher interest rates. On the other
hand, the value of both current and capital transfers
significantly fell short of our earlier projection, which is
mainly due to a fall in EU funding. Meanwhile, in line with
our forecast, the surplus of the real economic balance started
to decrease from the middle of the year.
The emerging picture of external balance is in line with our
existing knowledge about the domestic sectors’ financing
position. Although the deficit of the consolidated general
government continued to decline in 2008, the pace of
improvement in the balance was far behind the extent
characteristic of the initial period of adjustment. However,
households’ and firms’ net financial savings may have
declined in the first three quarters of 2008, which may
primarily be due to a fall in disposable income. An increase in
unit labour costs and the considerable rise in the cost of
funding mentioned above may have played an important role
in the decline of corporate income.
We expect a considerable improvement in the external
balance in 2009. Banks’ balance sheet data already show a
sharp fall in domestic borrowing for the end of last year,
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4.2  External balance
Chart 4-4
Components of the external financing requirement 
(Seasonally adjusted data; as a proportion of GDP)
* Dividends are usually voted for in the first half of the year. In 2008, in
an irregular manner, a large Hungarian company voted for a significant
amount of dividend in July, which upset the usual seasonality of the
income balance. In the time series shown, this item was corrected back
to Q2.
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Chart 4-5
Developments in the financing capacity of sectors*
* Adjusted by the difference caused by imports brought forward on
account of EU accession and by the increasing impact on import
generated by termination of customs warehouses following EU
accession, and by the Gripen purchases. ** The financing capacity of the
corporate sector is determined as a residual item, therefore it contains the
errors of other statistics as well. *** In addition to the fiscal budget, the
consolidated general government includes local governments, ÁPV Ltd.
(the Hungarian Privatisation and State Holding Company), institutions
discharging quasi-fiscal duties (Hungarian State Railways [MÁV] and
Budapest Public Transport Company [BKV]), the MNB and authorities
implementing capital projects initiated and controlled by the
government and formally implemented under PPP schemes.
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9 Income outflow related to direct investment also increased, although this figure is mostly based on estimation. More accurate information will only be available after
receipt and processing of the corporate profit and loss statements for 2008.
which projects a significant decline in consumption and
investment expenditures. The significant tightening of credit
conditions as well as the elements of the fiscal package that
make consumption more expensive may primarily enforce a
strong adjustment of household savings. However, we also
expect a decline in the corporate sector’s borrowing
requirement, since the postponement of investment,
increasing EU transfers and the reduction in tax burden may
offset the deterioration of profitability. As a result of the
erosion of major tax bases (wages, consumption), the SNA
deficit of general government may increase even despite the
fiscal measures.
10
Yet the GDP-proportionate external
financing requirement of the country may still decline by
nearly 5 percentage points compared to the previous year.
The improvement in the external balance, accompanying the
deep economic recession, may primarily appear in a large
increase in the surplus on the real economic balance through
a fall in import demand. However, there may be contrasting
developments in the income balance. On the one hand, we
expect a decline in income on equity, because in parallel with
declining sales opportunities in the domestic and external
markets, foreign companies’ earned incomes may also fall
considerably. On the other hand, as a result of the continuous
repricing of the maturing debt, the interest burden of the
country’s high external debt may continue to increase, even
if the level of the costs of funding remains unchanged. It is
worth mentioning that, due to the high proportion of foreign
currency-denominated external debt, the real economic
balance-improving effect of the weaker exchange rate is
attenuated by the increase in outflows of income on debt.
However, the forecasted high increase in current and capital
transfers from the EU may reduce the effect of declining
national income on the external balance.
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Chart 4-6
Implicit average interest rate of gross external debt* 
(including other capital)
* The implicit interest rate is the ratio of the average gross debt stock and
the relevant income outflow. The data source is Hungary’s balance of
payments statistics.
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* In addition to the fiscal budget, the consolidated general government includes local governments, ÁPV Ltd., institutions discharging quasi-fiscal duties
(MÁV, BKV), the MNB and authorities implementing capital projects initiated and controlled by the government and formally implemented under PPP
schemes. 
** In our forecast for the ‘errors and omissions’ item of the balance of payments we assumed that the cumulated figure for the last four quarters would
remain unchanged.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Estimation Forecast
I. Consolidated general government* -8.5 -8.3 -8.4 -9.4 -9.6 -5.9 -4.1 -4.7 -4.5
II. Households 2.7 0.2 2.4 4.4 3.3 1.6 0.8 5.6 4.5
Corporate sector and “error” (= A–I.–II. ) -0.9 0.1 -2.3 -1.7 -0.7 -1.1 -3.6 -3.0 -1.7
A) External financing capacity, “from above” (=B+C ) -6.7 -8.0 -8.3 -6.7 -6.9 -5.3 -6.8 -2.1 -1.7
B) Current account balance -7.0 -8.0 -8.6 -7.5 -7.5 -6.4 -7.9 -3.9 -4.5
– in EUR billions -5.0 -5.9 -7.1 -6.7 -6.8 -6.5 -8.3 -3.6 -4.2
C) Capital account balance 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.8 0.6 1.1 1.1 1.8 2.7
D) Net errors and omissions (NEO)** 0.3 0.3 -1.4 -1.8 -2.3 -1.6 -2.7 -2.8 -2.8
External financing capacity “from below” (=A+D) -6.5 -7.7 -9.7 -8.5 -9.3 -6.9 -9.5 -5.0 -4.5
Table 4-3
GDP-proportionate net financing capacity of individual sectors
10 The expenditures of the M6 highway carried out in a PPP-scheme play an important role in the increase of the SNA deficit of the consolidated general government.
Nevertheless, this will not appear in the official 2009 ESA deficit number.
In 2010 the increase in EU funds appearing in the transfer
items of the balance of payments may allow a further modest
decline in the dependence on external funding. Following a
sharp recession, a stabilisation in economic activity is
projected for 2010, both in Hungary and abroad.
Accordingly, if our basic assumptions hold, no improvement
can be expected in the real economic and income balances.
However, according to the government’s current forecast,
the funds available from the EU may exceed EUR 3.2 billion
in 2010, which may result in a slight decline in the external
financing requirement as a proportion of GDP.
4.2.1  FINANCING THE CURRENT
ACCOUNT DEFICIT
In 2008 the macro-vulnerability risks, which were the focus
of attention in the period of financial market turmoil at year-
end, increased on the financing side of the balance of
payments. In the first three quarters of 2008 the ‘bottom-up’
external financing requirement amounted to EUR 7.2 billion,
only a small proportion of which was covered by the net non-
debt generating items. As a result of heavy debt-generating
financing, the country’s net external debt continued to
increase, reaching 48% of GDP at end-Q3. From a financial
stability perspective, it is also negative that the proportion of
short-term debt within the increasing gross external debt has
risen. 
The loan agreement concluded with international
organisations provides adequate room for manoeuvre for
managing potential external funding problems. However,
over the short run, we may expect a further rearrangement
and unavoidable adjustment on the financing side of the
balance of payments. A significant part of the adjustment may
take place on the assets side, i.e. through the reduction in
external assets. In recent years substantial non-debt
generating capital outflows have been observed, partly in the
form of direct investment and partly in the form of portfolio-
type stock purchase. In 2008 Q4 such capital outflows may
have declined considerably or there is high probability that
they even reversed. In parallel, a further shortening of the
outstanding external debt is expected because, as a result of
the general mistrust in the financial markets, the private
sector presumably only managed to roll over its liabilities at
shorter maturities at the end of last year.
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Fact/Preliminary fact Forecast
1. Balance of goods and services -3.8 -2.9 -1.2 -0.9 1.4 1.4 4.1 4.0
2.  Income balance -4.9 -5.3 -5.7 -6.2 -7.3 -8.1 -8.2 -8.2
3. Balance of current transfers 0.8 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -1.2 0.1 -0.3
I. Current account balance (1+2+3) -8.0 -8.6 -7.5 -7.5 -6.4 -7.9 -3.9 -4.5
Current account balance in EUR billions -5.9 -7.1 -6.7 -6.8 -6.5 -8.3 -3.6 -4.2
II. Capital account balance 0.0 0.3 0.8 0.6 1.1 1.1 1.8 2.7
External financing capacity (I+II) -8.0 -8.3 -6.7 -6.9 -5.3 -6.8 -2.1 -1.7
Table 4-4
Structure of the GDP-proportionate current account
(Relative to GDP; per cent, unless otherwise indicated)
Chart 4-7
Hungary’s gross short-term debt
(At remaining maturity, as a proportion of GDP)
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5  Appendix: Evaluation of our 
inflation forecasts for 2008

In line with previous years’ practice, we again review to what
extent our inflation forecasts for last year were successful.
The measure of success is not primarily the difference
between facts and forecasts, since the MNB’s forecasts are
rule-based, conditional forecasts. Quantifying the effects of
the assumptions, the analysis can shed light on how precisely
our forecasting tools could capture the actual trends. 
The forecasts for the average annual inflation in 2008 are
examined below on the basis of two aspects: on the one hand,
we compare them with market analysts’ inflation forecasts,
and on the other, we break down the forecasting errors into
exogenous and endogenous factors. When assessing the
forecasts, it is important to emphasise that in the inflation
targeting system we prepare conditional forecasts; according
to our methodology, we do not try to forecast exchange rates
and oil prices, but we use rule-based assumptions for them. 
As of May 2006, we issued forecasts on inflation for 2008
eleven times. Up to May 2007 we thought that the inflation-
increasing effects of the fiscal adjustment package of 2006
would dwindle by 2008, and thus the average annual
inflation in 2008 might be close to the target corresponding
to price stability. Therefore, we projected inflation to be
around 3%-4%. It was in August 2007 that we perceived for
the first time that, due to the unfavourable harvest results,
increases were to be expected first in raw, then in processed
food prices, which could drive inflation for 2008 significantly
above target. Accordingly, from August 2007 to May 2008,
as a combined result of the rise in food prices and the
subsequent sharp spike in the price of oil, we gradually
increased our forecast. From February 2008 on we issued
forecasts which were very close to the later actual fact.
The MNB’s forecasts and the median of the projections of the
analysts participating in the Reuters survey are essentially
identical for the whole period (starting from August 2006,
since when both types of forecast have been available). There
was only one major divergence, in August 2007, when market
analysts had probably not yet taken account of the expected
increase in food prices in their forecasts. (Chart 5-1) The
average absolute error of the two groups of forecasters is 1.3
(MNB) and 1.4 (Reuters) percentage points.
11
When evaluating our inflation forecasts, it is worth
distinguishing between the effects of several factors. On the
one hand, the inflationary effect of the difference between
the rule-based basic assumptions (oil prices, HUF/EUR
exchange rate) and the actual oil price and exchange rate are
eliminated from the total difference. On the other hand, we
also eliminate the effect of regulated prices,
12
which are also
exogenous for our models, as well as the impact of the price
fluctuations of rather volatile agricultural commodities.
Namely, the price changes of the latter are driven not only by
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11 We took into account the Reuters survey corresponding to the month of publishing the Quarterly Report on Inflation. Consequently, given the date of the survey
within the month, market analysts were usually able to build their forecast upon a wider information base than the MNB. Calculated on the basis of the Reuters survey
in the month preceding the publication of the Report, the average absolute error is 1.5 percentage points.
12 On the one hand, the introduction and the subsequent withdrawal of the medical visit fee were considered an effect of regulation. On the other hand, the effect
showing to what extent the developments in regulated energy prices were different from the changes in market energy prices was also considered an effect of
regulation. 
Chart 5-1
Forecasts of the MNB and the analysts participating
in the Reuters survey for the 2008 average annual
inflation
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
M
a
y
 0
6
A
u
g
. 
0
6
N
o
v
. 
0
6
F
eb
. 
0
7
M
a
y
 0
7
A
u
g
. 
0
7
N
o
v
. 
0
7
F
eb
. 
0
8
M
a
y
 0
8
A
u
g
. 
0
8
N
o
v
. 
0
8
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
MNB Actual Reuters median
Year on year, per centYear on year, per cent
Chart 5-2
The MNB’s forecast and actual inflation in 2008
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economic effects, but significantly by other factors (e.g. the
weather) as well. Therefore, we performed a simulation in
which we calculated what inflation forecasts we would have
given for 2008 in previous Reports if we had known the
above variables (Chart 5-2).
The resulting forecasting error adequately reveals the
modelling error we actually made. To some extent, this error
contains the changes in the inflation effect of macroeconomic
developments (labour market, economic activity) which are
different from what was forecasted, and also includes the
error of the model used for the inflation forecast (i.e. the
error which the model makes, even in possession of the
factual figures of all explanatory variables). Based on the
simulation – eliminating the effect of exogenous factors – the
average absolute error is very low, at 0.2 of a percentage
point.
In addition to the modelling error, breaking down the error
explained by factors exogenous for our models may also be
enlightening (Chart 5-3). This reveals that from May 2006 to
November 2007 the exogenous error is mainly explained by
the basic assumptions, the increase in oil prices and
agricultural prices. Between February and August 2007
regulated prices had a significant negative impact. The
underlying reason is that the consumer price of natural
gas/district heating was increased to a lesser extent than what
would have been justified by the oil price increases,
13
and to
a small extent the effect of the medical visit fee – abolished in
April 2008 – also appears. 
On the whole, it can be concluded that our forecasts for the
year 2008 average annual inflation captured the
relationship between the domestic economic activity and
inflation well. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the
forecasting error over a year was relatively high, mainly
caused by exogenous factors (global energy price increases,
domestic regulated prices and volatile food prices). The
average modelling error was a mere 0.2 of a percentage
point over the entire projection period.
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Chart 5-3
The exogenous forecast error for average inflation
in 2008 
(i.e. excluding the economic cycle and the labour market)
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13 E.g. comparing our August 2007 regulated price expectations with the facts, we see that the overall effect of the deviation of non-energy regulated prices from the
expected was zero.
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